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12
13

STATEMENT OF CASE
In the past 26 years, the Utah court has taken jurisdiction over the

14

Respondent, who has been a resident of this state since 1977, and personal

15

jurisdiction over the Plaintiff, whose domicile is in California. This brief will

16

outline how this came about. Never during this period of time did the Utah court

17

stay any motion nor transfer jurisdiction to another state. Currently, the honorable

18

Judge, Claudia Laycock of the Fourth District trial court, Utah County is

19

attempting to nullify this history by ruling (Cite July 21, 2003) that Utah does not

20

have "subject matter jurisdiction". Yet, the previous judges ruled otherwise, and

21

this, after extensive litigating.

22
23

Summary of Argument
1. The Respondent argues that the Utah Courts previously ruled that the

24

Utah court has both personal and SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (Cite 476)

25

as stipulated by the Honorable Judge Guy Burningham. (Emphasis) This ruling in

26

particular finds In pertinent p a r t . . . .

27
28

Findings
"The Court finds that this Court has continuing
1

1

jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the Plaintiff."

2

Cite 2)

3

May the Court take judicial notice on pp 14 and 15 of this document where the

4

Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause in California in 1986 alleging that California

5

does not have subject matter jurisdiction, citing case law and codes of civil

6

procedure in support of his argument, (emphasis) Moreover, the Plaintiff filed a

7

motion in the UNITES STATES COURT OF APPEAL, FOR THE NINTH

8

CIRCUIT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA , San Bernardino County,

9

California dated 26 th of June, 2002, for want of "subject matter jurisdiction." The

10

court of Appeals summarily denied the Plaintiff's request, making it clear that

11

California does not have subject matter jurisdiction addressing the issue to both

12

the California and Utah courts.(see attachment)

13

CONCLUSION

14

Citing the above information, and stipulating to conclusions of law and

15

statute in the current brief, the Respondent categorically states that Utah has

16

Subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff regarding

n

the current matters before the court. Subsequently, the Respondent will refer to

18

law and statute as it relates to current matters in her Memorandum of Points and

19

Authority, submitting to the court that the Plaintiff has also filed an appeal in the

20

state of California. Included in this brief is a quoted "duplication" of the brief filed

21

by the California Attorney General's Office before the California Court of Appeals

22

as per the court's instruction. The issue at hand: "validating Utah jurisdiction."

23
24

Argument
2. The Respondent's focus will be to provide evidence, fact and law that

25

should convince the court that Utah jurisdiction is and has been the proper venue

26

for the last 27 years since the dissolution of the marriage in 1977. The

27

Respondent moved to Utah from California with eight of her 12 children within two

28

weeks after the divorce was final. The Respondent will proceed to show that the

1

Plaintiff voluntarily and deliberately acquiesced to the Utah jurisdiction filing

2

and responding to motions supplemented with affidavits, memorandum, petitions

3

to modify, etc for the last 26 years. At no time during that period did the Utah

4

court stay any motions thereby transferring jurisdiction of this case to another

5

court. See schedule of Utah Orders. (See Minute Entry, jurisdiction discussed

6

Cite 76)

7

3. (see Cite Utah Orders)

8 Cite:
9

10

10

June, 1979, Calif order registered in Utah w/
complaint

l i -

2. Order April 28,1980-Plaintiff summary Judgment

12
13

1.

denied
66

14

3. Stipulation-June 30,1980; Plaintiff agrees to support

increase

15

63

4. Order July 7,1980-reduced to "family Support"

16

77

5. Ruling August 4,1981: gifts not part of support orders

17

86

6. Order Nov., 27,1981, increase to $2500 per mo; Plaintiff

18

refusal to return children

19

124,25

7. Minute entry

20

110-114

8. Stipulation-2200 per month. Utah laws valid; signed by

21

both attorneys

22

188

9. Stipulation: June 1,1984: arrears: $13,500

23

126,27

10. Order July 14,1983; Increase of support to $2500

24

179

11. Order April 4,1984—Arrears $23,600-$500 bond

25

187,88

12. Stipulation November 30,1984

26 I

"

27
28

13. Stipulation, December 7,1984; plaintiff agrees to
arrears

206,07

14. Order on Order, Jan 22,1991

15. Order on Order April 24,1991, Utah jurisdiction,$3000
monthly support
16 Order Aug., 25,1991; arrears $3500
17 Order March 10 1993-Utah continuing jurisdiction:
arrears $29,200
18. Hearing July 28,1994; Utah jurisdiction
19. Order. Court Sanctions Plaintiffs dishonesty and
lies
20. Utah Order April 13.1995 Personal & Subject Matter
jurisdiction, (emphasis)
21. April 28,1999: support arrears: additional $62,991
OTHER
1. June 29,1983 Def Supp memorandum—Statue of
Limitations, Ut Court has Power.Cite Strong v Strong;
Callisterv Callister
2. August 15,1983: Ut Minute Entry: Denial of custodyPlaintiff
3. December 20,1983-Affidavit: History of Plaintiff
Pleadings: Custody hearing; Failure to pay family
support
4. Jan., 18,1984; Plaintiff in contempt of courtRespondent attempts to recover Children
5.1984-Bench warrant for Plaintiff
6. May 21,1984; Notice of arrearage;$24,816
7. June, Respondent Affidavit: $3000 per mo support
8. Jan., 3,1991; Affidavit Resp; Plaintiff brought action in
Utah; submits to jurisdiction; Agrees to $3000 per mo
support.
4

9. Plaintiff motion to modify decree;
10. February 5,1991: Reply to petition; Counter; False
sale of Medical practice
11. July 19, 91: Respondent Affidavit OSC: Plaintiff bad
checks; & arrearage
12. April 7, 92: Petition to Modify: Sale of Medical Practice
13. October 26, 92: Notice of Deposition Plaintiff
14. Plaintiff Motion to objection of Commissioner Maetani
15. Plaintiff Memorandum in support of objection
16 Memo in opposition to Plaintiffs objection to Maetani;
History of Plaintiff pleadings.
17. January 8,1993; Affidavit of Defendant
18. Plaintiff Stipulation to Collect support from his
Corporation.
19. Plaintiff Affidavit admission of lying under oath.
20. Motion to strike Plaintiffs pleadings re: M.D. Diet
-failure to be truthful
21 May 10,1994: Memorandum in support of Defendant's
motion to strike plaintiffs pleadings and produce
witnesses.
22. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Pla's motion to
set aside order of July 27,1994
23. Affidavit in support of motion to strike Pla's
pleadings—lies about M.D. Diet and current wife's
involvement
24. April 27,1995 Minute Entry—Utah has continuing
jurisdiction
25. Plaintiff financial declaration (false)
5

1

134-136

26. Plaintiff Designation of record to Utah Supreme Court;

2
3

No bond filed-dismissed
514

27. May 28, 2002; Affidavit: Additional arrears of

4

$86,844.48

5

OUTSIDE BRIEFS ON UTAH JURISDICTION

6

1018

1 . Application to File Amicus Brief

7

1032

2. Court of Appeal, California

8

1035

3. Respondent Intervenor: Declaration (California AG)

9

1045

4. Utah Order (being appealed)

10

1060

5. Plaintiff, Federal court of appeals (dismissed)

li

1063

6. Respondent's Brief (California Attorney General)

12

1078

7. Amicus Brief

13

—*

8. Letter brief, California AG-requested by court of
appeals 1

14
15

---**

16

9. Letter brief, Amicus Curiae

"

"2

"

Also it might be well to indicate additional activity as representative of

17

actions in the Utah Court, with both the Plaintiff and Respondent appearing and

18

represented by Counsel.

19

197

1) Affidavit, Respondent

January 3,

1991

20

201

2) Petition to Modify, Respon

January, 4 th

1991

21

207

3) Order to Show Cause

January 23,

1991

22

220

4) Petition to Modify, Plaintiff

February 5th

1991

23

221,223

5) Order on Order to show cause

April 24 th

1991

24

227

6) Affidavit, Respondent

July, 19th

1991

7) Order to show Cause

August 20 th

1991

25
26
27

'Find attached

28 I

2

Find attached
6

1

244,245

8) Order & Judgement

August 25,

1991

2

247

9) Petition to Modify, Plaintiff

April 7th

1992

3

266

10) Affidavit, Respondent

January 8,

1993

4

272

11) Notice of settlement conference

January 26,

1993

5

295

12) Judgement

March 3,

1993

13) Pre-Trial Order

March 10,

1993

6
7

590,549

14) Order, Court Sanction of Pla.

July 28,

1994

8

(Doc.missing)

15) Memorandum of Law

September 2

1994

9

466

16) Ruling

November 14,

1994

10 469

16) Final Pre-trial

December 1,

1994

li

17) Plaintiff (withdrawal of Counsel)

January 3rd

1995

12 472

18) Hearing

January 27,

1995

13

532,533

19) Order

April 3rd

1995

14

533

20 Affidavit, Respondent

15
16

477

1998

4. The Discretion of the Trial Court in this type of matter is very broad, the
Court sitting as a Court in Equity, to make re-distribution or other modifications of

17 the original Decree as equity might dictate. In Despain v. Despain, 610 P2d
18

1303. et. 1305. the Court stated as follows:

19

Under Utah Law, a Divorce Court sits as a Court in

20

Equity so far as child custody, support payments and the

21

like are concerned. It likewise retains continuing

22

jurisdiction over the parties, and power to make

23

equitable re-distribution or other modifications of the

24

original Decree as equity might dictate. In both the

25

formulation of the original Decree and any modifications

26

thereof, the Trial Court is vested with broad

27

discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an

28

Appellate Court only in the presence of clear abuse

1
2

thereof.
5.. In early 1995, The Respondent wrote the California Attorney General

3

asking for the assistance of the Attorney General's Office in collecting against

4

Utah Orders. It wasn't more than a week later when the California AG office sent

5

a memo to the Orange County District Attorney's Office, Department of child

6

support requesting collection of the Utah Orders.

7

California Attorney General's c o n c l u s i o n p.2, last line "Therefore,

8

it appears to be established that Utah has continuing, exclusive

9

(Emphasis) Memo: Cite: 1085-1086

10

jurisdiction".

6. It was after a meeting with the Orange County child support officers that

n

the Plaintiff made the decision to file a motion with the Orange County Superior

12

Court requesting a hearing regarding the registration of the Utah Orders, citing

13

jurisdiction and the Doctrine of Laches as his argument. He failed.

14

7. The Orange County Superior Court ruled in favor of the Respondent after

15

hearing both arguments and reading the pleadings of both parties. After

16

considerable deliberation the trial court ruled that both Utah and California have

17

concurrent jurisdiction, allowing the Utah support Orders to be registered, lifting

18

all stays against them. (Cite 678-680 ) It was at this point that the Plaintiff

19

decided to file an appeal in the Appellate Court, Fourth District, Division Three,

20

the State of California, (emphasis)

21

8. In the current litigation before the Appellate Court, Fourth District,

22

Division Three, State of California the Plaintiff is attempting to go back to a past

23

ruling of the 1997 appellate Court, where the Appellant.(Respondent) Marlene

24

Telford (Lundahl) attempted to have a 1994 Order set aside from a previous

25

California ruling on the basis she was denied the opportunity to appear before the

26

California Court. The issue of jurisdiction was not before the Appellate Court.

27

(Emphasis). Whereas, the Plaintiff asserts that the California Appellate Court in

28

its Opinion of 1997 states that "California has exclusive Jurisdiction over Spousal
8

1

Support" which is not accurate. The Honorable Commissioner Julee Robinson, of

2

the Superior Court of Orange County, California who heard the current case

3

reprimanded Counsel for Plaintiff's suggesting she read the California Opinion

4

again. ( See Transcript of Court Proceedings (Cite 953-974, Schedule of

5

Exhibits 998,999 )

6

The Court: I just have one question, I believe it's directed to you Ms.

7

Garland in some of the argument that you put forward you cited in

8

the original—and this may be wrong but I thought were you citing

9

the original decision that had been made by our court, Fourth District

10

Court of Appeal, which was Exhibit "G" which was filed on August

11

26th, 1997 for the authority that the court found that there was

12

exclusive jurisdiction.

13

I read that Opinion thoroughly and I didn't find any such dicta

14

regarding one court or the other having exclusive jurisdiction.

15

If anything, in footnote one on page four there was some discussion

16

that Jurisdiction was not an issue before the Court of Appeals. On

17

that appeal jurisdiction was not the issue. He stated, Quote, "so we

18

have jurisdiction all over the Place"

19

I'm not sure that Jurisdiction is the issue as much as it is the fact that

20

she was essentially deprived of her right to be present at that hearing

21

because of some comments that were made to her about what she

22

did and didn't have to do.

23

So, the only reference I find in that Court, our own court of Appeals

24

Decision, was basically saying it would be by virtue of dicta. It's not

25

essential to the holding that there was some representation at the

26

Hearing.

27

Anyway, that jurisdiction was not an issue, that there was jurisdiction

28

all over the place and that Mrs. Lundahl's Counsel, at least, seems

1

to feel there was concurrent jurisdiction at that time. Do you note

2

that as well?

3

The previous Utah Orders were valid under URESA. UIFSA was not ratified by

4

the Utah legislature until April 6,1996 and not until January 1, 1998 by the state

5

of California. Utah support orders were honored by the Riverside County ORS

6

under URESA. Therefore, the additional support Arrearage, of $3500, $29,200,

7

$61,100, $62,991 all fall under the federal statutes of URESA, and are

8

collectable.

9
10

9) California Dissolution order registered in Utah by Plaintiff as part
of Utah Decree (emphasis)

n

The California Dissolution Order was submitted and filed in

12

Utah by the Plaintiff when he and his Utah Counsel Mr. Wooton appeared

13

before the Utah Court June 27,1978 where the Plaintiff acquiesced to Utah

14

Jurisdiction by submitting a complaint along with the registration in Utah of

15

the California 1977 Dissolution Order requesting that the Utah Court act as

16

the controlling venue. ( Cite 10-24) Along with a Complaint ( Cite 2-4) lines

17

18-26. Note the upper right corner of page one, where the dissolution

18

has been stamped by the Utah Court. This document is certified by the Utah

19

Court.

document

20

The Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment and Decree of this Court

21

incorporating the provisions of the Judgement and Decree of the

22

Superior Court of the State of California and to have said Judgment

23

and Decree incorporated into and made a part of a Decree of this

24

fUtah]Court

25

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgement and Decree of this

26

court incorporating the provisions of the Decree of the Superior Court

27

of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles in

28

Case No SE D336650 ( Cite 10-24 )
10

1

10. The Respondent's argument is that Utah has taken jurisdiction of both

2 the Respondent and the Plaintiff in divorce matters since 1978, See Utah Court
3

Docket ( Cite 882 )

4

11. The Plaintiff has appeared personally, hired Utah Counsel to represent

5 him and many times has been the moving party. See SCHEDULE OF VARIOUS
6

UTAH PLEADINGS-PLAINTIFF)

7

Noall T. Wooton. Attorney of Record.

8 Page # Cite
9 2-4

1) Register of California Dissolution Order/Utah

May 9. 1978

10 2

2) Complaint

June 9, 1978

116

3) Order to Show Cause

June 19, 1978

12 7

4) Summons

June 9, 1978

13 5

5) Answer of Claim, Counterclaim

June 10, 1978

14 6

6) Motion for Order to Show Cause

July 1, 1978

15 6

8) Answer to Deposition

July 10, 1978

16 8

9) Motion for writ of Assistance

July 10,1978

17 9

10) Answer

July 10, 1978

18 32-34

11). Reply to Counter Claim

July 10, 1978

19 33

12).Affidavit in Support of Motion for writ

July 19, 1979

20 37

13). Order to Show Cause

July 19, 1979

21 46

14). Opposition to Motion for Production of Doc/s Sept 6, 1979

22 60-61, 57

15). Motion for Summary Judgment (Denied )

23 54,55

16) Pla's Statement, Pts of authority, Summ, Judg Dec .27, 1979

24 60

17). Ruling; Pla's Summary Judgment denied

April 14, 1980

25 62

18). Stipulation

July 2, 1980

26 66,67

19). Motion in Support of Order to show Cause

April 17, 1981

27 64

20) Plaintiff Affidavit

April 17, 1981

28 J 66

21). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
ll

Dec 7, 1979

May 1981

1

92

22). Acceptance of Service

2

Donald R. Jensen Attorney of Record

3

110

23). Stipulation

April 29, 1983

4

106

24). Order to Show Cause

April 22, 1983

5

129

25) OSC/Plaintiff Custody

July 6, 1983

6

124

26) Minute Entry, Pla's motion denied

July 6, 1983

7

134

27) Designation of Appeal

Aug., 30, 1983

8

150

28) Affidavit for writ of Assistance

Dec, 16, 1983

9

156

29) Plaintiff motion denied

De., 19, 1983

Feb., 1982

10

Robert M oodv. Attorney of Record

11

163

30) Motion to Continue hearing

12

169

31) Petition to Modify and Traverse/ Respondent March 15, 1984

13

167

32) Notice of taking Deposition

Mar 16, 1984

14

176

33) Plaintiff Affidavit

May, 16, 1984

15

186

34) Bench Warrant-Plaintiff

May, 1984

16

188

35). Stipulation

Nov.,30, 1984

17

190

36). Order on issues previous motion

Dec, 6, 1984

18

192

37) Plaintiff Surety Bond

Jan., 3, 1989

19

234

38) Notice of Deposition, Plaintiff

Jan., 27, 1991

20

220

39) Reply, Pet to Mod; Counter Petition

Feb., 5, 1991

21

225

40) Plaintiff request for pre-trial settlmt Hearing

April, 24th 1991

22

220

41) Supplemental Memorandum

Feb., 5, 1991

23

247

42) Petition to Modify

April 7, 1992

24

259

43) Summons

Nov., 11,1992

25

284

44) Plaintiff Memo/support of objection Maetani

Mar., 4, 1993

26

286

45) Plaintiff Reply Memo supp of objection

April 12, 1993

27

374

46) Notice of Deposition

Feb 3, 1994

28

362

47) Pla's objection to interrogatories, rec: for doc. Feb;, 4. 1994
12

Feb., 9, 1984

1 336

48) Plaintiff s Answers to Interrogatories

Feb., 14, 1994

2 423

49) Plaintiffs letter request for meeting w/Resp

March 7, 1994

3 418

50) Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition

June 6, 1994

4 446

51) Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition

August 16, 1994

5 428

52) Plaintiff Motion to set aside Order

Aug., 17, 1994

6 463

53) Pla, Memo Oppose Def motion to strike

Oct., 17, 1994

7 355

54) Plaintiff Affidavit, lying to court

8 See other pleadings from 1991 (on page 3 -this document) filed February 8,
9 2002.There are 47 different motions and added to the above 54 — this comes to a
10 combined total of 101 Different Court Actions, Motions and Pleadings by the
11 Plaintiff.
12

12. The Plaintiffs first Utah Counsel was Noell Wooton, followed by Robert

13

Moody, Donald Jensen, Richard Allred, Dana Burroughs, Sean Egan, Esq and

14

David Drake. These parties represented the Plaintiff in his many Utah motions the

15

Plaintiff filed and responded to, in the Utah jurisdiction.

16

Jurisdiction vs jurisdiction

17

13) The primary issue is whether the California Order of 2002 along with

18 the long list of Utah orders (26) Cite p.3. this document (Cite 976-978 ) are
19

valid. See also the 1995 and 1998 Utah orders summarizing arrearage that the

20

Plaintiff owes the Defendant). (Cite 193-197 ) Note Respondent's Affidavit on

21
22
23
24

Utah jurisdiction:
Plaintiffs insistence on Utah jurisdiction.
14. There is a long history of motions that have been filed by the Plaintiff
in the Utah courts. The Plaintiffs purpose in submitting to and even requesting

25

the jurisdiction of the Utah courts was based on the courts' reputation for being

26

conservative in its judgements and rulings, ( Cite Plaintiff's declaration of his

27

wanting Utah jurisdiction). See Loose copy (enclosed)

28

The Plaintiff declares:
13

1

I have voluntarily traveled all of the way to Utah for the purpose of

2

submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah .. . (Cite p 1)

3

I indicated in previous declarations and or pleadings that I would be

4

willing to submit myself to the Utah Courts"

5
6

Equally important the Plaintiff asserts:
15. In a motion filed by the Plaintiff in the Superior Court of the State of

7

California, for the County of Los Angeles, December 18, 1986, the Plaintiff

8

adamantly proceeds to establish facts demonstrating that California does not

9

have jurisdiction to hear matters regarding issues of divorce by the parties,

10

through chronologically submitting numerous dates where the parties filed

11

motions and appeared in the State of Utah.

12

1. THIS COURT [California] MUST DISMISS

13

RESPONDENT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO

14

MODIFY A UTAH ORDER ON THE GROUNDS THAT

15

THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH

16

THE UTAH ORDER AS A FOREIGN JUDGMENT IN

17

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

18

In the case of Hamilton v. Superior Court. (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 418, the

19

court declared that, "a foreign decree can be enforced in this state only by action."

20

As such, the Court in Hamilton was merely applying well established statutory

21

law. California Code of Civil Procedure Sec 1913 states:

22

"The effect of a judicial record of a sister s t a t e . . . can

23

only be enforced here by an action or a special

24

proceeding."

25
26

In the case of Leverett v. Superior Court: (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 126, the
Court declared, in pertinent part,

27

"It is now the settled law and policy of California that

28

foreign—created alimony and support obligations, as

14

1

well as child custody awards, unless established as a

2

foreign judgment in this state not be both enforced and

3

modified in the California forum" (emphasis)

4

The Leverett Court also cited with approval the decision in Worthlv v.

5

Worthlev, (1955) 44 Cal.2d 465, explains that foreign domestic judgment or

6

Decree once that foreign Decree has been established as a Judgment in this

7

Sate.

8
9

Markey: California Family law. Sec 51.06 [1] relying on Hamilton and CCP
Sec 1913, declares:

10

"The support and custody provisions in a foreign

11

judgment or decree may not be modified by the courts of

12

this state until the foreign judgment is first established

13

as a California judgment. This may be done by filing a

14

civil action or special proceeding to establish the foreign

15

judgment as a California judgment. (Emphasis)

16

2. THIS COURT MUST DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S

17

ASSERTION THAT ONLY CALIFORNIA HAS

18

EXCLUSIVE CONTINUING JURISDICTION. ON THE

19

GROUNDS THAT THE CALIFORNIA COURT LACKS

20

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (emphasis)

21

In the case of Sharove v. Middleman. (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 199. 201-202.

22

the Court made it clear that a foreign court has the jurisdiction to determine

23

matters of child support if "the Court obtains personal jurisdiction over the paying

24

spouse and that THE STATE is the state of the Child's domicile, residence or

25

presence."

26

As a matter of fact:

27

16. The Plaintiff has appeared before the Utah Court on numerous

28 I occasions as both the moving and responding party. As a result of one such
15

1

appearance, on July 14,1983, (In response to Respondent's motion to modify

2

support) the Fourth Judicial District Court, of Utah County, Provo, Utah made a

3

support order which has continued in full force and effect until the present time.

4

17. In addition, in the recent case of Daves V. Daves. (1985) 173 CA 3d

5

9JL the parties obtained their divorce decree in the State of Oklahoma. Shortly

6

thereafter, mother moved to the State of California and both parties entered into a

7

written stipulation to establish the Oklahoma Decree in California. Husband later

8

filed an action in Oklahoma which was subsequently dismissed on the grounds

9

that husband had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of California when he

10

executed the Stipulation to establish the Oklahoma Decree in California.

n

" . . . Benjamin entered into a stipulation in which he asked that the

12

Oklahoma judgment of divorce be entered as a California judgment and

13

that the judgment be modified as to its visitation provisions" id. 106.

14

The Plaintiff in the current matter falls under this directive when he

15

registered the California Dissolution Order in the state of Utah, as a Utah Order

16

requesting Utah be the venue of jurisdiction.

17

18. Historically, both the Plaintiff and the Respondent entered into a

18

number of stipulations in the Utah court. The Plaintiff also appeared in Utah to

19

have his deposition taken. The Utah Courts have repeatedly asserted personal

20 jurisdiction over support and over the Plaintiff himself, who is domiciled in
21

California but who has willingly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the State of

22

Utah. Since the three of the Support orders pertains to "family" support a reading

23

of Utah Civil Code Section 5152 is necessary:

24

(1) A Court of this state which is competent to decide child custody

25

matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by

26

initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth in any of

27

the following paragraphs are met:

28

(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time
16

of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been
the child's home state within six months before
commencement of the proceedings and the child is
absent from this state because of his removal or
retention by a person claiming his custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent
continues to live in this state.
(b) It is the best interest of the child that a court of this
state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is
available in this state substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships.
(c) The child is physically present in this state and (i) the
child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or
is otherwise neglected or dependent.
(d) (i) it appears that no other state would have
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in
accordance with (a) (b) (c), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of
the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
19. Since the children of the marriage have resided continuously in the

17

i

State of Utah since 1978 up to their year of majority when they left their home to

2

attend school or work, being emancipated at the age of 18, and where there was

3

substantial evidence concerning their welfare, protection, training, and personal

4

relationships, and the fact that the Plaintiff supplied their financial needs while the

5

children were living in Utah, by analogy, the California Court did not have the

6

requisite jurisdiction of the matters which have been identified. And since the

7

Respondent has lived in Utah for the past 27 years and at the same address, and

8

since the Utah courts have taken jurisdiction over alimony, it stands to reason that

9

jurisdiction of support should continue in the same manner today, as it has been

10
11
12

in the past.
In the case of Jaqqer v. Superior Court, (1979) 96 CA 3d 579 the Court
declared, in pertinent part,

13

Even if jurisdiction exists in California, it may be

14

inappropriate to exercise it here when another state also

15

has jurisdiction and is ready to exercise it, and when the

16

Plaintiff is willing to litigate elsewhere; a stay is the more

17

common remedy."

18
19
20

Another case of equal importance is Hafer v. Superior Court, (1981) 126
Cal.App.3d 856. The Original Dissolution was made in San Diego Superior Court
. The Court awarded custody of the minor children to the father.

21

Thereafter, the father moved with the minor children to the state of Idaho, where

22

they lived except for a brief period when the mother fled with the children and

23

took them to Florida. Mother then filed a modification action in the San Diego

24

Superior Court. At the time, the children were living with their mother in San

25

Diego. The San Diego Court assumed jurisdiction on the ground that since the

26

Court had rendered the original custody Decree, it retained continuing

27

to. modify provided that there was no pending proceeding in the State of Idaho.

28
18

jurisdiction

1

Father, on the other hand, argued that the California Court lacked modification of

2

jurisdiction under UCCJA precisely because California was no longer the

3

children's home state and they had no substantial contacts with California.

4

(emphasis) He also argued the fact that the San Diego Court who had made the

5

ohginal Decree was not a basis for jurisdiction in the modification action. In

6

granting a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in California, the

7

Court of Appeals agreed that there was no basis for iurisdiction in California since

8

Idaho was now the Children's home state, (emphasis) The court also stated that

9

under UCCJA, the intent of the legislation was to prevent bringing modification

10

procedures and unsuitable forums without making a bonafide attempt to invoke

11 the jurisdiction of the correct court. Hafer. Id. at 662. The Court went on to
12

declare.

13

The normal preferences for adjudicating custody

14

disputes in the home state where the children live,

15

where the most evidence of their daily living conditions

16

will be found, where the continuity and stability of their

17

parental relationships and their daily routines will be

18

least disrupted by the legal procedure. This case shows

19

a prime example of the kind of disruption the act was

20

intended to prevent. Id at 865

21

20. The present case is a classical example of what the Plaintiff is

22

attempting to do to the Respondent. Any one of the above scenarios could and

23
24

should apply to the present case.
In the case of Schlumpf v Superior Court. (1978) 79

25

Cal.App.3d 892 where similar circumstances occurred is another case of

26

similarity. California was the original state of dissolution. The father and the

27

children moved to Wyoming. 9 years later the mother sought a modification of

28 I custody in the California Court. The trial Court found that the California Courts
19

retained jurisdiction. Later the father filed a Writ of Mandate arguing that
Wyoming was the most convenient forum. The Court of Appeals found California
and Wyoming had concurrent jurisdiction. However, since the Children lived in
Wyoming the court ruled that Wyoming had a closer connection with the Children
and was the proper forum for litigating in the best interests of the children.
21. And finally both legal Counsels for Plaintiff and Respondent signed a
Stipulation agreeing to Utah jurisdiction and obeying the Utah Court orders with
the permission of both parties ( Citel87-88) p.4, lines 3, 4, and 5. See also same
Document p.4 (c) Where the Support payments are frozen!
. . . On each and every occasion described herein, Petitioner appeared in
the State of Utah and submitted himself to the jurisdiction in the State of
Utah for the purpose of allowing that State to modify support orders
regarding both the Respondent and the minor children in her care and
custody..( Cite 911-915 ) lines 1-5.
Utah agencies declare the validity of Utah Jurisdiction.
22. In 1992 The Attorney General of Utah wrote a letter to the Riverside,
California ORS stipulating that Utah does have jurisdiction. ( Cite 1080,81 ) The
Utah AG cited the circumstances and filings by the Plaintiff in the Utah courts.
In 1996, the Utah ORS sent the ORS in California a stipulation verifying
that the Custodial parent, the Respondent was in need of arrears owed her.
23. California Courts stays Plaintiffs California motions in favor of
Utah jurisdiction
Superior Court of Orange County
With respect to the scenario where Respondent Mrs. Lundahl, is
going to return to the State of Utah* the Court finds that if she does in
fact return to the State of Utah with the minor children that there is no
change in circumstances and prior custody orders issued and filed
on August 24, 1987 [Utah] shall remain in full force and effect.
20

1

Los Angeles County, Norwalk Court: (Cite pp 996-97 ) Hosp dec!.

2

All of Dr. Lundahl's actions for modification of the child custody case

3

have been stayed. Dr Lundahl has 60 days in which to file a motion

4

for modification in the Utah District Court; during that 60 day period

5

you are awarded custody of the minor child Christian . . . .

6

See also Respondent's Affidavit

7
8
9

Note Respondent's Utah Activity summary of divorce matters
in Utah as well as California (Addendum)* 3 concurrently

(attached)

24. At the time of the Plaintiff's deposition his legal counsel was Sandra

10

Rhodes. Note statements: (Cite, Schedule of exhibits 998,999-#9 p.24)

n

Miss Rhodes: In case you're interested, there's also an URESA action pending

12 in Riverside all involving Mahene, as we say, a //'tf/e forum shopping to see how
13 \we cat) do in which jurisdiction. I think. Im not involved in that, but I know it is
14 pending. If the Court will peruse the entire deposition the Court will discover the
15

Plaintiff's strategy of eternally filing motions in his relentless efforts to frustrate

16

and exploit the courts as well as the Respondent..

17
18

25. The Plaintiff is clearly " guilty" of "shopping" other forums. In August
of 1983 he filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angles, Norwalk Division.

19

The Plaintiff was represented by Barry Wishart, in his petition for custody of the

20

minor children. However as early as July 6.1983 the Plaintiff initiated custody

21

modification proceedings in Utah. The matter was originally scheduled to be

22

heard on July 14.1983. and the court made certain orders with respect to an

23

increase in child support payments and a modification of visitation rights.

24

However, the court did not rule on the custody modification, but continued that

25

aspect of the proceeding until August 15.1983. On July 16.1983. but two

26 I days after the hearing in the Utah matter, the Plaintiff filed an order to show
27
28 I

3

Find enclosed
21

1

cause for modification of child custody in the California jurisdiction. It was brought

2

to the attention of the California Court and eventually the Court permanently

3

stayed the proceeding since the same action was pending in the state of Utah.

4

a) Declaration of Hosp re the California Courts decision to stay the

5

proceedings in California pending the outcome of the Utah Court's

6

decisions. Petitioner ordered to return minor children to Respondent

7

c Minute entry, Utah, Custody of children denied Dr. Lundahl; (Cite 131,32)

8

(See Utah minute entry, and Affidavit, Respondent ( Cite 96-98)

9

26) In 1987 the Plaintiff filed a declaration with the California court

10

stipulating to Utah as the venue of jurisdiction and the Plaintiff's willingness to

n

have the Respondent collect from his Corporation as well as from him personally,

12

on support orders . (Cite 310 ) California Stipulation of Plaintiff's liability both

13

personally and corporately

14
15

27. While the support issues were being heard in Utah, (1993,
1994,1995) The Plaintiff filed another OSC dated January 15.1993 before the

16

Riverside County Court in an attempt to modify the Utah family support order.

17

The Plaintiff failed in his effort as the court ruled the Plaintiff would have to return

18 to Utah to modify the family support order since Utah had jurisdiction over the
19

matter. Again on February 22.1993, one month after the hearing in

20

Riverside, (Cite. California Deposition extracts 999; p. 2 / lines 1-3)*4 The

21

Plaintiff filed another OSC in the Orange County Superior Court with Counsel

22

Sandra Rhodes representing him. The issue was custody of the minor child

23

Kwinci. At the time that this motion was filed the Plaintiff was in contempt of a

24

Utah Court order mandating he place a $500 bond in the event he initiated

25

removing a minor child beyond the state lines without notice to the

26

Respondent. Essentially that is exactly what the Plaintiff did when he arranged for

27
28 I

4

Find enclosed
22

1

Kwinci to fly to California without the Respondent having any knowledge of where

2

her daughter was. (Cite 179 ) Utah order $500 p.2. item 3. See above where

3

California court permanently stays Plaintiff's motion for custody of children stating

4

that Utah had "continuing jurisdiction" regarding the custody of the minor children

5

of the Plaintiff and the Respondent.

6

28) On July 8.1994. the Plaintiff filed another motion in the Orange County

7

Superior court with the purpose of terminating child support & asking for attorney

8

fees. The matter was heard on August 8,1994. The Plaintiff filed still another

9

motion on December 27.1994 in the Civil Court in the Superior Court of Orange

10

County charging the Respondent with breach of contract, common counts

n

(money received and owed back—$100,000 ) and fraud. Kent Tibbetts, the

12

Respondents California Counsel filed a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings;

13

Points and Authorities with Request for Judicial Notice. Mr. Tibbetts also filed an

14

answer & counter-claim. The motion was granted and the case dismissed.

15
16

29 This is a total of seven different petitions initiated by the Plaintiff in a
period of two years if the Utah petition is included. It is important the court

17

remember that any motions filed in California was in direct conflict to the authority

18

of the Utah courts and the statutes of URESA's position on jurisdiction. It is the

19

Respondent's opinion that this is a clear indication of "harassment" by the Plaintiff

20

in order to frustrate her -purposefully using the California courts to serve his

21

own purpose's hoping to win b y " attrition" alone.

22 I
23 I

PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF RESPECT FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF

24 |

BOTH UTAH AND CALIFORNIA JURISDICTIONS.

25
26 I
27

30.lt is indeed unfortunate that the Plaintiff feels such contempt for justice
and the rule of Law that he "attempts" to manipulate the court system bending

28 I when he can the infrastructure of the very system that protects our society and
23

guarantees it's citizens individual freedoms, without any regard to the
consequences of those he hurts.
31. Notice the dichotomy the plaintiff explores in his California deposition
taken in California by his second wife, Ruth Carlson Lundahl. ( Cite Deposition p
25, lines 1-5). It's in this moment of transparency that he claim's that Custody
jurisdiction is in California and support issues are in the Utah jurisdiction. Since
there are no longer children at home, this leaves the investigator with the
impression by the Plaintiff' own admission that support issues are to be
litigated in Utah. In the same deposition, the Plaintiff's arrogance surfaces once
again (Cite Deposition p .22-23 )
Q: Are you under an order to pay Spousal Support to Marlene?
A Yes.
Q. How much are you ordered to pay her on a monthly basis?
A: I'm not sure. I have a Utah order, I have a California Order and I'm
not following either. (Dep p.23 lines 4-5).
(Cite Deposition Extracts, Petitioner See p. 25, lines 1-5)
Q . . . "Do you have an action pending to modify the California
order?
A. "No, I have an action in Utah. Riverside essentially looked at the
thing all in all and said go back to Utah; that's where this thing belongs. So
right now we have split jurisdiction; custody jurisdiction is in California and
Alimony jurisdiction is in Utah."
33.lt was only a few months ago that the Respondent's Utah Counsel,
Michael Esplin, called the Respondent requesting that she come into his office.
He angrily slapped his desk with some documents. He had been served with a
Summons by the Plaintiff. The PLAINTIFF had filed in the United State District
Court, Central District of California, Santa Ana Division. ( Cite 1065-1066 )

24

motions citing does 1-though 20 accusing certain parties of fraud, conspiracy,
racketeering & corruption. Along with the Respondent, the Plaintiff listed three
Utah attorneys, Esplin, Petty, and Fugal and their respective law offices which
have successfully represented the Respondent. Also included in the Plaintiff's
"black" list were four judges of the Fourth District Court of Utah County, Utah,
who have ruled favorably in regards to the divorce issues regarding the
Respondent. Included in the list is the Honorable Judges, Howard Maetani. Guv
Burninqham, Donald Evre .and Lynn Davis.. The plaintiff in this action cites Utah
Constables Anthony Ferlund.and Ron Lyons as defendants also. In addition the
Federal Judge Honorable Glen Clark, of Salt Lake City, Utah, Julia Montgomery
Deputy District Attorney .Orange County District Attorneys Office. Santa Ana
California, Office of Child Support; Commissioner Julee Robinson of the Orange
County Superior Court, and Mary Dahlberq deputy Attorney General all named as
defendants. The Plaintiff is clearly out of control causing the Respondent undue
stress and emotional trauma. It seems that the Plaintiff, Gerald D. Lundahl sues
anyone that opposes him in litigation or any judge that rules against him in a court
room. The Respondent's Utah attorney, Michael Esplin called the Plaintiff's Utah
Counsel, Richard Drake, asking what the reason was for all the law-suits the
Plaintiff was filing. Mr. Drake responded by telling Mr. Esplin that he couldn't get
in touch with the Plaintiff because he was enjoying a long Holiday in Paris,
France. To date the Respondent has yet to be served; however nearly everyone
else in the state of Utah named in the Pleadings have been served. (See (a)
Affidavit filed by Respondent's Counsel and (b) decision of the Federal Court in
California; (c) letter from Utah Counsel Esplin to Plaintiff's Utah Counsel David
Drake (Cite court documents Appeals file)
34.The Plaintiff has the propensity to go as far as he can in "bragging"
about the things he -"gets away with-concerning the courts. A further review of

25

the 1993 Deposition clarifies this statement
2

3

THE PLAINTIFF WITH DELIBERATE CUNNING HAS MADE FALSE

4

STATEMENTS, WITHHELD EVIDENCE, AND CONSTRUCTED FALSE

5

DOCUMENTS IN ORDER TO PUT HIMSELF IN A FAVORABLE LIGHT

6

BEFORE THE COURT

7

.

8
9
10

35. In 1993-94 when the Plaintiff appeared before the Fourth District Court
in Utah he made false statements in his Utah deposition regarding his M.D.Diet
Centers. The various issues addressed were:

n
12

a) Plaintiffs Purchase of a diet Center in Moreno Valley California
(1994) $47,500 while claiming his only income was $1570 per month.

13

b Diet Centers registered in the State of Nevada under Imperial

14

Products with Plaintiff's 5th wife Mary Ann Hadley, Sec/treasurer. President:

15

Robert Rohrbock, (who through affidavit claims he has met the Plaintiff only once,

16

denying he was ever involved in a business venture with Plaintiff).

n

c) Construction of a stipulation under the direction of the Plaintiff

18

through his Utah Counsel Dana Burroughs claims Plaintiff's only income is

19

$1,570 per month. (See attached)

20
21

d) The Marketing of M.D. Diet. Ownership of M.D. Diet Centers by
Plaintiff is a published fact;

22

e) Claim by Plaintiff that he had sold the diet centers to a "man"

23

named L.G. Hinds, who turned out was Plaintiffs 3 rd or 4 th wife.Lucille Gerokas

24

Hinds. Evidence of Marriage Licence: "false"bulk sale to L.G. Hinds (Plaintiff's

25

wife)

26

g) Plaintiff's affidavit submitted to Utah Court for lying. (Cite 383)

27

h) Respondent's Utah legal Counsel's affidavits and memorandum to

28

strike Plaintiff's pleadings concerning above facts: (Cite 384, 388,397, 418 ).

26

1

successful.

2

3
4
5
6

i) Utah Court Sanctions Plaintiff for dishonesty and false claims Cite

383)
k) Plaintiffs non-registering of any diet entities in any agencies in the
state of California
I) Deception by Plaintiff revealing he made hundreds of thousand of

7

dollars in 1993-1994 in direct contradiction of financial declarations filed with the

8

court and Plaintiff's testimony of financial status to Utah court and the information

9

submitted in the Plaintiff's Stipulation which the Respondent refused to sign

10
11
12
13

URESSA not UIFSA controls the arrearage of support monies
owed by Plaintiff
36. The California Court had ratified UIFSA (Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act) on January 1, 1998, therefore the 1994 California Order was still

14

under the auspices of U R E S A . . . .meaning that one order does not nullify another

15

order from another state.

16
17

37. It is the understanding of the Respondent that the Plaintiff would have
had to return to Utah to modify any Utah support order since the Utah Court was

18 the last venue to rule, and a court order issued by this state is not nullified by an
19

order from another state, nor can this state nullify an order from another state. A

20

"void 1994 Order" has since been superceded by the current order of the

21

California Court in 2002.

22
23

38) It should be noted that the Plaintiff successfully attempted to deceive
and confuse the court by unilaterally stating

24

. . . a Judgment determining property and support issues was

25

entered in California September 14, 1977. Thereafter, spousal

26

support was modified by the California Court in 1987 at the

27

[Respondent's] request...

28 I This entire statement is flawed and incorrect. The Plaintiff took advantage of the
27

1

court in his pleadings giving the impression to the California court that 1987 was

2 the second time that the parties were in court since the 1977 dissolution order.
3

The Plaintiff failed to disclose to the California Court that in the interim of

4 the years 1978 through 1994 98% of all issues regarding divorce and support
5
6

issues were litigated in the state of Utah. ( Cite Utah Docket 882)
39.Later Information surfaced which proved that the Plaintiff had not told

7 the truth in his deposition and had given false testimony before the Utah Court.
8 After the Plaintiff admitted lying to the Utah court through affidavit, the Court
9

sanctioned the Plaintiff for lying and dishonesty and ordered him to place in a

10 trust fund $3000 for the purpose of depositions on the parties involved with the
n

M.D,. Diet business located in the state of California, which the Plaintiff owns.

12 (The Respondent's Utah Counsel, Mr. Michael Esplin, was expected to go to
13 California for the purpose of taking depositions.) However the Plaintiff ignored the
14 court's order and received a contempt citation.
15

40) The incorporated findings of the Utah court were that Utah had

16 continuing jurisdiction of the parties; that the Plaintiff had failed to obey court
17 orders, had given admittedly false testimony at his deposition and had failed to
18 purge himself of the court's contempt order. ( Cite pp 384,388,397) The
19 Respondent cites evidence of jurisdiction by the Utah Court activity attached to
20

21

this pleading (See Utah Docket, Utah Court of Appeal).

The Plaintiff defied the subsequent rulings of the Utah Court and fled

22

to California to file another OSC on July 8, 1994 in the Orange County venue

23

addressing the same issues.

24
25
26

DOCTRINE OF LACHES
4 1 . Currently, in the California Courts the Plaintiff claimed the Doctrine of
Laches in support of his attempt to avoid honoring the Utah Orders. However,

27

not only has the Respondent in this matter attempted through litigating on

28

numerous occasions but through correspondence was denied assistance by the

28

i

Utah Office of Recovery in her attempt to get satisfaction regarding the

2

registration and collection of orders .Under normal circumstances the Office of

3

Recovery in Utah must process court orders through the Office of Recovery in

4

the jurisdiction of the Obligor. However, the Department of Health and Human

5

Services in Utah would not avail the Respondent of their office claiming that it

6

was against the policy of the Utah agency. At the same time the Utah Human

7

Services Office which is the tribunal for the collecting of support orders suggested

8

that the Respondent appeal to the California Agencies.

9

42. With this suggestion and with Extracts from the Handbook on Child

10

Support Enforcement distributed by the Department of Health and Human

11

Resources, Washington, D.C. the respondent appealed to the Attorney General

12

of the state of California. The Attorney General of California sent instructions to

13

the Orange County District Attorney's office to begin collection on the Utah

14

orders. Any authorized agency mandated to collect on family support matters is

15

supported by California Codes of Civil procedure.

16

Respondent's List of written communication to local, regional and

17 federal agencies
18

1) Department of Recovery Services, 1996.

19

2) Letter from Judge David Gray to Orrin Hatch, 1996

20

3) Department of Social Services, Sacramento, Calif. June 1996

21

4) Administration for Children & Families, San Francisco, CA Sept

22
23

24

27, 1996
5) Department of Health & Human Services (also Riverside ORS)

Feb., 10, 1997

25

6) Department of Social Services; Sacramento, CA May 7, 1997

26

7) Director, Department of Human Services. 1997

27

8) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. April,

28 I

27, 1998
29

1

9) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. Aug 8,

1997

2
3

10) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C.

4

April, 27, 1998

5

11) Administration for Children & Families, Washington, D.C. April

6

27, 1988

7

12) Regional Depart of Human Services, (Denver) Co, September 26,

8

13) Director, Department of Human Services, Utah, 2001

9
10

These letters are but a reflection of the efforts made by the Respondent to
register and collect on arrearage owed by the Plaintiff (Appellee) As a result of

11 this activity The Respondent alleged any attempt by the Plaintiff to vacate the
12

Utah Orders should be dismissed. All attempts by the Respondent during the

13

years of 1996 through 2001 was made in a timely manner. The Orange County

14

District Attorney's Office became involved being the tribunal to collect on Utah

15

orders. Fortunately they too filed motions against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's

16

attempts failed.

17

43.The battle continues. The Plaintiff filed additional motions. An Active

18

motion was submitted by the Orange County District Attorney's Office acting as

19

Intervenor.

Jurisdiction vs. Jurisdiction

20

Utah Attorney General on Utah jurisdiction. (Cite 1081-2)

21

Plaintiff Designation of Record on Appeal to Utah Supreme Court )Cite

22

134-136)

23

Utah Stipulation (Counsels for Plaintiff and Respondent.^ Cite 10,114)

24

Lundahl Dissolution: Letter from California Counsel Hosp for Respondent

25

California action staved (Cite 996,7 )

26

Utah Minute Entries, August 15, 1983: (Cite 131 )

27

Affidavit of Respondent: Chronology of California and Utah Actions:; (Cite

28

p 2, this pleading)
30

1

Plaintiff's verification to Riverside Family Support by deposition that Utah

2

has Jurisdiction. ( Cite 911 -915 Schedule of Exhibits Cite 998,999)

3

Plaintiff's admission of "forum" shopping. (Cite #9, Schedule of Exhibits

4

Cite 998-999 )

5

Plaintiff's Constant filing of motions Cite p.8,9,10 this pleading)

6
7

44. Another document which verifies that the Plaintiff was fully aware of the

8

$29,200 order (which he alleges he knew nothing about) occurred when he and

9

his attorney Dana Burroughs constructed a stipulation which the Plaintiff wanted

10 the Respondent to sign, on the premise that he only made $1570.00 per month.
n
12

The Stipulation was faxed to the Respondent's counsel Mr. Esplin. ( attached)
The Respondent had found evidence that the Plaintiff was not telling the

13

truth and refused to sign it. Obviously the Plaintiff was earning more than $1570

14

per month. The Plaintiff's American Express card account, which the Respondent

15

has in her possession shows a dramatic excess of what he claimed he made,

16

averaging in the neighborhood of $8000 per month charged on his American

n

Express Credit Card. Nevertheless, on page 3, item 12 the $2900,200 is

18

mentioned which again proves the Plaintiff was aware of this order: ( see

19

attachment)

20

. . . presently has a judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of

21

$29,200 as entered by the Court on March 10, 1 9 9 3 , . . . As

22

satisfaction for that judgment, the Lundahl Trust shall pay to

23

Defendant a lump sum of $5,000 . . .

24

SUMMARY OF FALSEHOODS BY PLAINTIFF

25

26

1) Proof of service to Plaintiff by California Marshall

27

2) Plaintiff's Contempt of Utah Court

28

3) Plaintiff's affidavit of lying to Utah Court
31

1

4) Defendants successful Utah motions against Plaintiff

2

5) Plaintiff's Falsely constructed bulk sale of M.D. Diet to L.G. Hinds, who

3

the Plaintiff said was a man, but in actuality was Lucille Gerakos Hinds the

4

Plaintiff's third or (?) fourth wife.

5

45. The Orange County District Attorney's Office registered the orders

6

(April, 1999, April 1995, March 1993, August 1991, and April 1991) as mandated

7

by the California Attorney Generals's Office after considerable deliberation and

8

following Federal Statues under the Enforcement of Child Support, along with the

9

support of UIFSA, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. California ratified this

10

Act in January 1998 and Utah in 1996. Until that Act was ratified the support

11

orders were submitted and collected under the authority of URESA.

12

46. The Respondent asserts that any California continuing jurisdiction

13

arising from the dissolution terminated when both parties willingly litigated the

14

issue of family and spousal support as well as custody matters in the State of

15

Utah. Both parties have litigated in the Utah jurisdiction since 1978, with the

16

exception of a temporary stay in California where the Respondent located while

17

her daughter trained for tennis. Even then, she claimed Utah as her residence

18

and paid taxes there.

19

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY.

20

(Quoted dialogue by the California Deputy Attorney General on Utah jurisdiction)

21

Since the California Court in 2002 declined to establish the arrears,

22

reserving the issue for later hearing, the order was interlocutory (Cowan v.

23

Moreno, supra 903 S.W. 2d at p. 121) Id at p. 124 under UIFSA). The Court went

24

on to hold that under UIFSA, the petition to register raises the issue of

25

enforcement of arrearges. (/.d.at p 123) furthermore, since the order to be

26

registered was valid on its face, it could only be attacked on specific grounds

27

such as lack of personal jurisdiction or some procedural defect that would render

28

the decree void. (Ibid). "There is no d e f e n s e . . . to the registration of foreign
32

1

support orders.' (UIFSA section 606. Comment 9. U.L.A. 126. 160 (supp. 1994V"

2

Ibid. However, there is no jurisdiction to appeal an interlocutory order (ibid.) The

3

court held that Cowan's pleading challenged the amount of the arrears, which

4

relates to enforcebility rather than to the existence of the support order. (Id. at pp

5

123-124) Since the trial court expressly declined to establish the arrears,

6

reserving the issue for a later hearing the order was interlocutory. The Order on

7

appeal denied the Plaintiff's request to vacate the registration, but specifically

8

continued the issue of the amount of arrears owed. The issue of arrears was later

9

taken off calendar until the California Appeal is concluded. This is thus an

10
11

interlocutory order and the appeal should be dismissed.
The Plaintiff argues that this case is appealable because the Utah orders,

12

having been registered in California, are immediately enforceable. (Plaintiff's

13

California Letter Brief p.2.) He looks for support of his contention in the holding

14 from In re Marriage of Adams (1987) 188 Ca:.App.3d 863 which stated that "Such
15

postjudgment order, which relates to enforcement of the judgment, is appealable.

16

[Citation] (id. at p 688.) However, "such postjudgment order" in that case related

17

specifically to a postjudgment order granting or denying motions under former

18

Civil Code section 5124, which related to community property settlements and

19

military retirements within certain time limits (id. at p. 686, fn 3) Nevertheless, a

20

judgment must fully dispose of the litigated matter, i.e., there must be a final

21

determination of the partes ' rights, before an appellate court will entertain an

22

appeal (In re Marrriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App. 4 th 685.689).

23

This order does not fully dispose of the issues before the court because the

24

Plaintiffs arrearage obligation was continued to a future date, since taken off

25

calendar due to the California appeal.

26

The Utah Child and Spousal support orders became enforceable

27

immediately upon registration. The Plaintiffs petition for writ of supercedeas was

28

denied. The appeal court has jurisdiction to deem the appeal to be a petition for
33

1
2
3
4

writ of prohibition (Olsen v. Cory (1983) 35Cal.3d 390, 400.)
EFFECT OF THE 1991 AND 1995 UTAH ORDERS ON THE 1977
CALIFORNIA DISSOLUTION ORDER
"The California Department of Child Support enforcement adopts the

5

argument that the Utah orders did not modify the California Orders, they were

6

independent orders running concurrently-and adds the following:"

7

Under URESA, child and spousal support were treated identically.

8

(Sampson, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996) fAM.I.q. Summer 1998,

9

Prefactorv Note, at 403). It is a well-settled law that the responding state in a

10

URESA action could not modify a support order from another state without clearly

11

stating that the new judgment modified the previous judgment and only then with

12

proper notice and opportunity to be heard. (See former Fam.Code. Section 4840

13

(repealed by stats. 1997, ch 194 Section 1). In re Marraige of Ward (1994) 299

14

Cla.App.4th 1452, 1456-1457; In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99

15

Cal.App.3d 514, 521-522.) Instead the responding state entered a denovo order.

16

(Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Enforcement after

17

United States v. Lopez (Apr 1996) 144 U. Pa. L Rev. 1469. 1484) The two

18 judgments ran concurrently and payments to one were credited against the
19

other. (Former Fam. Code Section 4840). If an obligor chose to pay on the lower

20

order, arrears would accrue under the higher order to account for the difference.

21

This is what is happening in the present case.

22

Kammersell. Vs Kammersell (Utah 1990) 792 P.2d 496 is in accord with

23

this reasoning. In Kammersell, a Pennsylvania court, responding to a request

24

from Utah to enforce a Utah order, entered a lower support amount. (Kammersell,

25

Supra, 792 P.2d at p. 496-497). The Utah Court held that Pennsylvania had not

26

modified the Utah order because it did not specifically provide that it was a

27

modification as required by URESA. (Id. at p. 498-499). Since it was the Utah

28

order that was higher, the court was not required to review the validity of the
34

1

Pennsylvania order—arrears had accrued under the higher order (id.at 498)

2

The Plaintiff's reliance on Rimensburger v. Rinensburger (Utah

3

Ct.App. 1992) 841 P.2d 709 is misplaced. That opinion was interpreting Utah's

4

intrastate transfer of jurisdiction and found that, internally, one district court did

5

not have jurisdiction to modify the orders of another district court. (Id. at p. 710) It

6

did not address the issue of establishing a denovo order. The Court in

7

Kammersall made the correct analysis of the effect of multiple support orders.

8

That analysis is applicable to this case. Until the enactment of the Full Faith and

9

Credit for Child Support Order Act (FCCOA. 28 U.S.C.A. 1738B) or the Uniform

10

Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), states were able to establish multiple child

11 and spousal support orders. As Kammersall explains, a subsequent order did not
12

"modify" a previous order. Kammersall v. Kammersall 792.P.2d 496. 498 (Utah)

13

1990)

14

The assertion by the Plaintiff that a subsequent order is "void and of no

15 force and effect" is incorrect. (Plaintiff's California Letter Brief, pg 5). As the Utah
16

Court stated:

17

It is true that under these acts a responding state . . .

18

may set a different amount that the 'obligor (Plaintiff)

19

must pay, and in that sense there is a 'modification' of

20

an amount, but we do not believe and do not hold that

21

the decree of the 'initiating' state . . . was modified,

22

vacated, reformed or eliminated Oglesby v. Ogesby,

23

510 P.2d 1106. 1107(1973)

24

This principle is applicable regardless of which order sets the highest

25

amount of support. A subsequent order that sets a lower support amount has no

26

mathematical effect on the aggregate arrears that may be owed. Conversely, a

27

subsequent order that sets a higher support amount has the undeniable effect of

28

being the order used to calculate the aggregate arrears. While the subsequent
35

1 lower order may have no effect on the calculations, it is still a valid order that is in
2 force. If the support under the first order terminates earlier than the support under
3 the second; obviously, the second order would have force and effect on the
4 ongoing obligation and any arrears after the termination of the initial order.
5

Again Reliance on Rmensburger v. Rimsburaer. 841, P.2d 709 (Utah

6

Ct.App.1992) is completely misplaced since Utah has correctly held it is only

7

applicable to subject matter jurisdiction between two courts. Banklerv.

8 Bankler, 963 P.2d 797.800 (Utah Ct. App 1998). Citing Oglesby, the court in
9 Bankler basically reaffirms the proposition that the ability to "modify" its initial
10 order rests solely with the initial court. ( I d ) . The Bankler court was not presented
n

the issue whether a Utah court could enter a valid, independent, subsequent

12 order in the context of there being another states's order.
13

(Citing Amicus letter brief) One of the major differences between interstate

14 and intrastate family law prior to UIFSA and FFCCSOA was the ability of one
15 state to establish an order for prospective support when there was an existing
16 order on the same issue in another state. Within many states, there was only one
17 court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its order. The court also had
18 exclusive jurisdiction in the sense that no court in another state could modify or
19 invalidate the order. However, there was no exclusivity over the support
20 obligation. This multiplicity of valid obligations created the problem that UIFSA
21 was designed to solve.
22

The ability and practice of a subsequent court entering a valid child

23

support order in a different amount dwindled as states began to adopt UIFSA. A

24 state adopting UIFSA no longer had the ability to issue new, subsequent orders.
25 The practice came to a complete halt with the enactment of FFCCSOA on
26 October 20,1994. After that date, a state had to give full faith and credit to the
27 child support order issued by another state. New orders are not permitted. Only
28 "true modifications" can occur. As the practice of entering subsequent orders
36

1

ceases, there becomes only one tribunal with the exclusive jurisdiction to

2

prospectively modify the support obligation.

3

Recognizing that multiple, valid orders entitled to full faith and credit had

4

been created, both FFCCSOA and UIFSA set up the same mechanism to

5

determine which of the multiple orders would control the issue of prospective

6

support. 28 U.S.C.A. 1738B (f) & Fam. Code 4911. FFCCOA only applies to

7

child support orders. However, UIFSA as a matter of state law does apply to

8

spousal support orders. (Fam. Code Section 4901 (r) and (u). It is premised on

9

there being one tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over all support (child or

10

spouse) obligations. UIFSA provides for a very limited circumstance that will

11

allow transfer of the exclusive jurisdiction to modify the child support obligation.

12

The distinction between child support and spousal support is that once the first

13

tribunal enters an order regarding the spousal support obligation, the obligation

14

can only be modified by that tribunal. (Fam. Code Section 4909). This has

15

already been discussed in amicus curiea; the fact that the determination of

16

controlling order provisions of UIFSA do not apply to spousal support orders.

17

Whether the Utah state court proceeding that resulted in support

18

orders from that court were conducted pursuant to the Revised Uniform

19

Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, or

20

another statute.

21

The California Attorney General's Office would respond that the

22

initial Utah spousal support order was an independent cause of action not

23

conducted pursuant to either the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of

24

Support Act (RURESA) or the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.

25

The resolution of this issue is not dependent on the caption of the

26

pleadings. Often, it is not dependent on the imprecise working of an order. As

27

the court noted in Oglesby, and interstate "modification" is not really a

28 I modification. Oglesby, supra at 1107. Of greater significance is the Utah court's
37

1

recitation in the 1991 "Order on Order to Show Cause" that the court issued its

2

order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5 (3). Although this section has

3

been revised since 1991, the substance remains the same. In pertinent part, it

4

provided in 1991: "The court has continuing jurisdiction to make . . .new orders for

5

the support and maintenance of the parties . . .as is reasonable and necessary."

6

Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3) (revised.)

7

Any contention by the Plaintiff that Utah can only establish spousal support

8

in the context of a divorce is unavailable. The Utah Supreme Court confirmed that

9

the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) permitted Utah to

10

establish an independent spousal support order. Lamberth v. Lamberth. 550 P.2d

n

200, 202(1976) It is interesting to note that the court in Lamberth fell into the

12

misnomer addressed by the same court in Oglesby and characterized the Utah

13

action as a "reduction" of the support previously ordered. (Id.) The court

14

obviously believed the subsequent Utah order was a valid order.

15

The California Department of Child support would disagree with the

16

Plaintiff that this action for a new spousal support amount was pursued under the

17

Utah Foreign Judgments Act. (Appellants Letter Brief, pg 8, California) Bankler is

18

correct: The Utah Foreign Judgment act does not confer jurisdiction on a Utah

19

court to prospectively modify an order issued by a foreign state court . . .

20

Bankler, supra at 800 (emphasis added)

21

The Utah Foreign Judgments Act is similar to the Foreign Judgment Acts of

22

most states. It is a legal construct for enforcing judgments. It is not to be used to

23

establish prospective obligations. Its ability to even alter existing judgments is

24

extremely limited. It is a method for collection of obligations that have been

25

reduced to a judgment or have become judgments by operation of law.

26

It is precisely because of the temporal limitations on actions under a

27

Foreign Judgment Act that URESA and RURESA were utilized for family support.

28

For cases with no orders, they provided a structure for a resident of one state to
38

1

obtain services in another state for the establishment of an order.URESA and

2

RURESA also provided a legal construct for a tribunal in one state to issue a new

3

support order for prospective support, when there was already an existing order

4

in another state. The Plaintiff is correct that the orders in this case were not

5

obtained using RURESA. One distinction is that private counsel was used

6

instead of the Department of Human Services or the Title 1V-agency. However,

7

the use of RURESA is not dispositive of the validity of the order.

8
9
10

The version of RURESA used by Utah acknowledged:" The remedies
herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies".
Utah Code 77-31-3 (repealed). It further provided" "Support order' means any

11 judgment, decree, or order of s u p p o r t , . . . regardless of the kind of action in
12

which it is entered" and "Duty of Support' includes any duty of support imposed or

13

impossable by law or by any court order, decree or judgment. . . whether

14

incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance of

15

otherwise." Utah Code Ann.77-31-2 (10) and Utah Code Ann. 77-31-2(6) (both

16

repealed). Clearly, at the time the Utah court entered its orders, RURESA was

17

not the exclusive means to obtain spousal support in Utah. As the Utah court

18

noted, the duty of support in this case was impossable under Utah Code Ann. 30-

19

3-5(3) and was imposed by a court order in a proceeding for separate

20

maintenance.

21

Whether the September 22, 2003 Utah state court order has been

22

appealed and if so, the effect of the pendency of that appeal on this

23

proceeding.

24

(Quoting from amicus curiae -letter brief:) amicus curiae can only

25

hope that the 2003 Utah state rulings will ultimately be reviewed by a competent

26

court. Not only is it incorrect in this case; but, it misconstrues the entire

27

jurisprudence of Utah

28

As previously discussed, to the extent of the Utah court "purporting"
39

1

to modify" the existing California order, it was not a true "modification". Thus, the

2

first issue decided in the 2003 order is not factually correct. To be sustained, the

3

decision would have to be re-characterized as a finding in 2003 that the same

4

court did not have jurisdiction to enter its independent order in 1995. The fallacy

5

of this has been discussed as well. The Utah court's holding that it is invalidating

6

the April 13 1995 Order has the effect of reinstating the original 1991 order. If

7

this ruling is correct the Plaintiff actually owes support higher on the 1991 rate.

8

The ruling does nothing to invalidate the Judgment obtained in 1999. It should be

9

noted that the arguments being made now were available in 1999 but were not

10

raised either at the hearing that lead to the judgment nor in any appeal.

11

(emphasis) The incorrectness of the ruling is also apparent since the 1995 order

12

modified the 1991 Utah order, not any California Order.(Cite 1078,amicus brief)

13
14
15

The second issue ruled upon by the 2003 Utah order is essentially the
same as the first and the associated problems are the same as discussed above.
Assuming the court's third ruling is upheld, it will resolve the issue first

16

propounded - the determination of a prospectively controlling order. If Utah is

17

now deferring exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support to California, then the

18

prospective support will be what California determines. However, this ruling can

19

only be prospective.

20

Apparently, the Utah court was lead to believe that waiving the wand of

21

UIFSA over the case would solve all the issues. Thus, the court decided to apply

22

UIFSA retroactively unconditionally. The application is not that simple. The

23

Plaintiff would have this court believe that the trend "is to use UIFSA to declare all

24

subsequent orders entered using URESA, RURESA, or some other remedy are

25

superfluous and void ab nitio. (Appellant's California Letter Brief, pg 9) citing

26

State of Utah, Dept of Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939 (Utah

27

Ct.App.1999) No state had gone that far. This interpretation of retroactivity would

28

mean the section on determining the controlling order in a multiple order situation
40

1

is truly superfluous. (See Fam. Code Section 4913). If all subsequent orders are

2

now void in Utah, actions for refunds when those orders were higher would soon

3

abound. The holding does not make it clear if it applies to all subsequent orders

4

from all sates that are now being enforced in Utah or it applies to all subsequent

5

Utah orders regardless of where they are being enforced. It is obviously this last

6

application that the Plaintiff is wanting to foist upon this court. Being stated

7

without any restrictions, the ruling would apply to both child and spousal support

8

orders.

9

What Jacoby held is that the procedural aspects of UIFSA can be applied

10

retroactively. (Id. at 942). This is the corollary to the "general rule followed in

11

Utah" that the substantive law in effect at the time the action was initiated governs

12 the action. Wilde v Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct.App.1998). Surely the Plaintiff
13

will not contend that retroactively invalidating all support orders that were valid at

14 the time of entry is only "procedural", it is also doubtful that Utah intends this
15

wholesale invalidation to be its jurisprudence. Under Utah law, the issue of

16 whether a law operates retroactively is a question of law and no deference to the
17

decision of a district court must be given. Jacoby, supra at 941. In addition, the

18

issue of retroactivity of UIFSA is a lynchpin that the Plaintiff' uses in his argument

19

in California that Utah lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its orders. If the

20

premise that UIFSA applies retroactively to invalidate all subsequent orders is

21

found to be incorrect, then at the time of entry of the orders in this case, Utah law

22

allowed subsequent spousal support orders to be established using either

23

general family law provision or RURESA, so the orders entered by Utah are valid.

24

Valid sister state judgments are entitled to full faith and credit meaning that the

25

Plaintiff owes all missed payments of spousal support calculated using the

26

highest order in existence at the time, (amicus curiae)

27

It is the opinion of the California Attorney General's Office (Intervenor) that

28

41

1 Utah could only issue independent spousal support orders. To this day, Utah can
2

not enter an order that modifies, supercedes, or nullifies the spousal support

3

provisions of any California orders.

4

WERE THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO

5

URESA, UFJA, OR OTHER STATUTE? (Taken from Letter Brief submitted to

6

California Court of Appeals)

7

The California Attorney General's Office adopts the argument that the Utah

8 spousal support order was not issued pursuant to URESA or UFJA. In this case,
9 the action in Utah began as a civil complaint by the Plaintiff to enforce his
10 visitation rights. The Utah court had jurisdiction to entertain an order for support in
n

such an action. (See e.g.., Utah Codes Annotated 1953 Section 30-3-3) [in any

12 action to establish an order for parent-time, the court may order a party to provide
13 support for the other party during the pendency of the action.])
14

THE SEPTEMBER 22, 2003, UTAH ORDER HAS BEEN APPEALED.

15

Respondent, Ruth Telford (Lundahl) filed a notice of appeal with the

16

Utah court Appeals on October 2, 2003. The California Department of Child

17 Support Enforcement (Respondent Intervenor, California Deputy Attorney
18 General) adopts and joins the argument regarding the errors of the 2003 Utah
19 order.
20

"The order in Utah appears to be in response to a motion to strike

21

respondent'sorder to show cause filed by the Plainitff on March 4, 2003, while

22

this (California) appeal was pending. (Motion for judicial Notice, Exhibit B p. 13.

23

California Attorney Generals Office). The Order to show cause was issued on

24

May 29, 2002, and the Plaintiff was served on June 22, 2002. (Id. at p. 11) These

25 dates are significant when it is noted that the order on appeal in California was
26 entered May 3, 2002, and notice of appeal in California was filed on July 2, 2002.
27

Furthermore, at least part of the delay in hearing the order to show cause in Utah

28 was because the Plaintiff filed a federal action, naming judges and attorneys in
42

1 Utah as defendants, which required recusal."
2
3

(a former argument citing another issue on Utah jurisdiction)
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is ancillary to the issue of

4 jurisdiction It requires that jurisdiction exists in two different forums or states (Cf
5

. In Re Marriage of Fox (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 862. 873 [225 CR 823]) This rule

6 of law is codified in Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.30 which provides, in
7

pertinent part: "When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in

8 the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this
9 state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any
10 conditions that may be just." "There must be jurisdiction over the defendant and
li

the assurance that the action will not be barred by a statue of limitations.

12 (Stanqvik. supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 752): (Shilev Inc. v Superior Court (1992) 4
13 Cal.App.4th 126. 133 [6CR2 38|) Although the Defendant raised a question of
14 jurisdiction in California, she pointed to the pendency of the same action in Utah
15 (Cf. Atlantic Richfield Company v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 168,176
16 M24 CR63)- motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens held to include motion
17 to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction arising from failure to include an indispensable
18 party.) Consider:
19

In a case in which the juvenile court's jurisdiction was not

20

raised the California Court of Appeal indicated that if an

21

objection based on forum non conveniens was not made in the

22

trial court the issue was waived. (In re Christopher B. (1996)

23

43 Cal.App.4th 551. 558-559 [51 CR2 43]) The appellate court

24

distinguished a decision from the California Supreme Court in

25

re Stephanie M.. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 [27 CR2 595]) The

26

Supreme Court had considered a forum non conveniens

27

argument in that case noting t h a t " . . . the Court of Appeal

28

erred in assuming that without notice of a pending Mexican
43

i

proceeding, the juvenile court was under no obligation to

2

consider whether it was the appropriate forum." (In re

3

Stephanie M.. supra. 7 Cal.4th 295. 312 [27 CR2 595])

4

In The Defendant's case the court was aware of the pending Utah litigation.

5

6

ARGUMENT AGAINST CALIFORNIA JURISDICTION

7

8
9

Subject matter jurisdiction can be attacked at any time, in addition to in
personam jurisdiction and this does not constitute a general appearance.

10 (Boisclair v. Superior Court. (1990)) 51 Cal.3d 1140. 1144. fn.1 [276 CR 621)
li
12

A party may also make a hybrid motion to quash/dismiss, thereby
challenging both subject matter and personal jurisdiction without making a

13 general appearance. (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 387. p.
14 99JL
15

The Respondent asserts that any California's continuing jurisdiction arising

16 from the dissolution terminated when both parties willingly litigated the issue of
17 family and spousal support as well as custody matters in the State of Utah. Both
18 parties have litigated in the Utah jurisdiction since 1978.
19

See Sollev v. Sollev (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 522. 529

20

[38 CR 802[) -both parties entered into a property

21

settlement agreement in California, then invoked the

22

jurisdiction of the State of Nevada for their divorce and

23

incorporation of the property settlement agreement.

24

When wife later filed suit in California for an accounting,

25

the Court of Appeal determined that the Nevada decree

26

was binding on the parties and California had no

27

jurisdiction.

28

See also (Cf. Leverett v. Superior Court (1963) Cal.App.2d 126 [34 CR
44

784] -continuing jurisdiction where wife registered Washington judgment in
California then opposed California jurisdiction.
The fairness question necessitates balancing the burden of
inconvenience to the Defendant against the states interest in resolving the
dispute. (Id. At pp. 97-101 [56 LEd.2d at pp 144-147]). It was not fair to force the
Defendant to litigate the same matter in California that was pending in the State
Court of Utah. (In Re Marriage of Aaron. Supra. 224 Cal. App.3d 1086. 1095 [274
CR 357])

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority, i.e.,

competency, to adjudicate the type of controversy involved. (Witkin. California
Procedure. 4th ed.. Jurisdiction, section 6(c). p. 552]). The actions of a court
without subject matter jurisdiction are void and may be set aside at any time.
(Estate of Buck, supra.. 29 Cal.App.4th 1846. 1854 [35CR2 442]).
If as contended California lacked subject matter jurisdiction there was no
concurrent jurisdiction involved and Utah had exclusive jurisdiction. (see
pp 14,15. this document. (Witkin. California Procedure. 4th ed.. Jurisdiction,
section 427(1 ).p. 1042)
Personal or in personam jurisdiction depends upon three factors: (A)
Jurisdiction of the state. (B) Due process, i.e., notice and opportunity for hearing.
(C) Compliance with statutory jurisdiction requirements of process (Witkin.
California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 80. pp. 45-451.) Jurisdiction is based
on an underlying principle of "relationship to the state" which makes the exercise
of jurisdiction "reasonable." (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 82.
p. 452.) The Defendant and the children of the marriage have been residents of
the state of Utah since 1977.
The state of California ratified the UIFSA Act in January of 1998. The Utah
Court ratified the same Act in April of 1996.

"URESA" IS THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY IN THE MATTER OF
45

1

THE 1995

2

MATTERS

3

TAKEN BY THE UTAH COURTS.

4

UTAH ORDER SINCE JURISDICTION OF ALL SUPPORT
REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF AND THE RESPONDENT WAS

The Plaintiff historically submitted to the statutes of URESA honoring

5

the Utah orders, which were registered by the District Attorneys Office of

6

Riverside County in the state of California. According to [UIFSA] under the

7

Chapter of Jurisdiction ( 78-45f-201)... "this state may exercise

8 jurisdiction over a non-resident individual, iffjjtthe
9

personal

individual is personally

served

with notice within this state;||) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state

10

by consent by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive

document

11

having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction:...

12

other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for

%) there is any

13 \ the exercise of personal jurisdiction J j | ) The custodial parent and the children
14

resided in the state of Utah. The Plaintiff has consistently fulfilled all of the

15

above, issues were pending in the State of Utah.

16
n

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RE: ISSUES OF URESA
The purpose of [URESA] is to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation

18

in separate jurisdictions the enforcement of existing duties of family support. See

19

NRS 130.030: State ex rel. Welfare Div v. Vine, 99 Nev. 278. 283. 662 P.2d

20

295, 298 (1983). Generally speaking, [URESA] itself "creates no duties of family

21

support, but is concerned solely with the enforcement of the already

22

duties when the person to whom a duty is owed is in one state and the person

23

owing the duty is in another." See Annotation. Construction and Effect of

24

Provision of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. NRS 130.280 (1)

25

directs that: A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this

26

chapter does not nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court

27

of this state pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a court of

28

any other state pursuant to a substantially similar law or any other law,

46

existing

l

regardless of priority of issuance . . .(Emphasis). 31 ALR 4 th 347. 351 (1984)

2

citing Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Commissioner's

3

Prefactory Note, 9B U.L.A. 382 (1968); see also NRS 130.280; Vix V. State of

4

Wisconson. 100 Nev. 495 686 P.2s 226 (1984) (in URESA proceedings, a court

5

only has jurisdiction to order enforcement of pre-existing duties of support).

6

Moreover, the remedies provided by the act are "in addition to and not in

7

substitution for any other remedies." See NRS 130-050. The act further

8

provides that it "shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general

9

purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." See NRS

10

130.020. (Emphasis)PI1 [**6]

11

the "duties of support . . . are those imposed . . . under the laws of any state

12

where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought."

13

Utah Code Ann. @> 77-31-7 (1995) (repealed 1997). Thus under URESA, Utah's

14

statute of limitations would govern the duration for which support could be

15

r e c o v e r e d . . . . However, UIFSA's choice of law provision states that "in a

16

proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws of this

17

state or of the issuing state, whichever is the longer, applies." Utah Code

18

Ann. @ 78-45F-604 (Supp. 1998).

19|

URESA's choice of law provision provided that

(P.12). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "statutes of limitations

20 | are essentially procedural in nature and . . . . do not abolish a substantive right to
21 I sue . . . "Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572. 575 (Utah 1993): See also Financial
22

Bancoorp. Inc. V. Pingree & Dahle. f**7| Inc.. 880 P2d 14m 16 (Utah ct. App.

23

1994)_(stating "Utah follows majority position that limitations periods are

24

generally procedural in nature"). Similarly, UIFSA's choice of law provision does

25

not establish a substantive right or create a duty of support, but simply changes

26

the mechanism by which support orders are enforced by instructing the court as

27

to which law to apply in calculating arrearages. UIFSA merely provides a

28 I framework for enforcing one states support order in another jurisdiction.
47

1

Undoubtedly, the outcome may differ depending on which statute of limitations is

2

applied; however, the rights created and possessed by the parties are found in

3

provisions separate and apart from the choice of law section. . "Full faith and

4

credit" provisions are outlined in the United f*943] States

5
6
7

Constitution.

(Emphasis)
B. Spousal Support Obligation
Utah Code Ann. @ 78-45f-206 (2) (Supp. 1998). ( P26) makes it clear in it's

8

reference to Spousal Support. In Utah, a court may only modify a spousal support

9

order issued by another state if the Utah court has "continuing, exclusive

10 jurisdiction" over the spousal support order. The method of which a Utah court
11

order obtains "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over a spousal support order is

12

by [*946] "Issuing [**19] a support order consistent with the law of this state . .

13

." Utah id. @ 78-45f-205 (6). Thus, a Utah court cannot obtain "continuing,

14

exclusive jurisdiction unless it issues the spousal support order.

15

tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this

16

state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order

17

THROUGHOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION! Since

18

1980 the "family Support" orders issued by the state of Utah and collected upon

19

by the Riverside ORS included both Child support and alimony. All other orders

20

which are now in dispute are family support orders, with the exception of the 1998

21

Support Order. The 1995 Order stipulated the amount of spousal support but all

22

arrearage was family support.

. 6). . A

23

24

THE UTAH COURT MAY PROPERLY EXERCISE JURISDICTION BECAUSE A

25

FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE CAN BE MODIFIED BY A SHOWING OF

26

CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

27

28

The Plaintiff asserted the Utah court lacked jurisdiction because the

48

1

decree which the Defendant sought to modify was originally rendered in a

2

California Court. This is clearly not the law. The Utah Supreme Court stated that

3

Utah Courts have the jurisdiction to modify the provisions of a foreign divorce

4

decree if such decree could be modified under the law of the rendering state and

5

under Utah Law. McLane v. McLane 570 P.2d 692 (1977).

6

The giving of full faith and credit to the judgement of a sister state simply

7

requires that it be given the same credit as it would be given in that state; and

8

also the same credit that it would be given if rendered in the courts of our own

9

state. With respect to divorce decrees the Utah statute provides that:

10

The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such

11

subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support

12

and maintenance of the parties, the custody of children and

13

their support and maintenance. . . as shall be reasonable and

14

necessary. Even though the decree is res judicata as the

15

circumstances existing at the time of the decree if there are

16

changed circumstances so requiring there can be further

17

adjudication thereon. A Courts decision concerning the amount

18

of support can, however, be modified at any time during the

19

support payment period (Civil Code 4801 (a) in remarraige of

20

Morrison 143 Cal Rptr. 139 573 P.2d 4 1 . (1978).

21

A divorce decree can also be modified under Utah law by showing a

22

change in circumstances. Thus the full faith and credit requirement is met

23

because the modification sought is appropriate under both California and Utah

24

law.

25
26

In the McLane case involving a custody dispute, the court set forth the
requirements for jurisdiction in a case of this nature.

27

"The needs of children for sustenance and for protective

28 I

care are continuous and it is essential that wherever
49

1

they may be the court have jurisdiction to safe guard

2

their interest and welfare. Consequently for that purpose properly

3

interested parties may invoke the jurisdiction of the court based on

4

either (1) the domicile of the child or (2) the presence of the child

5

within the state or (3) in personum jurisdiction over the parties

6

seeking custody. Furthermore, anyone, or more of those basis is

7

sufficient foundation for jurisdiction upon which a court may proceed

8

to hear and determine such controversy.

9
10

ALL OTHER JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS WERE MET BECAUSE THE

11

DEFENDANT [RESPONDENT] AND THE CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES WERE

12

RESIDENTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE PLAINTIFF HAD

13

VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE STATE OF

14

UTAH BY BRINGING ADDITIONAL ACTIONS.

15

16
17

A summary outline of jurisdictional issues.
Pleading

Action

YR

18

Plaintiff Registers California Dissolution Order in Utah

1977

19

Calif Order: back to Utah

1983

20

Hosp letter; Utah custody

1983

21

List of Utah Orders

1978—1998

22

Utah Jurisdiction,

23

Federal Handbook statutes

24

Calif AG Office on registering of Utah 2001 orders

2001

25

Declaration: Plaintiff submits to Utah jurisdiction

1987

26

Plaintiff s motion: California Does not have jurisdiction.

Utah Attorney General

27
28
50

1992

1983

l

Respectfully,

2

3

Marlene Telford (Lundahl)

4

InproSe

5

6

.-' . : y . i ,

J
;

;

* > " ' . •••-•!--{'''e-

Date :^ " i

>

2004

;

p.s. An ADDENDUM will follow with supporting motions and statements from the

7 California Attorney Generals Office and an Amicus Curiae Brief from the Attorney
8 Generals Office in Texas, filed in the California courts per California AG Office.,
9 Also copies of three (3) letter briefs to be filed in the Appellate Court of California
10 in deference to a request from the bench. The California Deputy AG; Barry
11 Brooks Amicus Brief and myself are the participants.
12

13 I
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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PROOF OF SERIVCE
I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within action.
On February 6, 2004 I personally served the foregoing document Opening
Brief and related documents at the Appellate Court 450 South, State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah as well as mailing same documents personally on the interested
parties in this action.
Executed on February 6, 2004 at Provo, Utah.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah that the
foregoing is true and correct.

^
/
-r

T?

'

•*

Amanda North LS*
2233 North 800 West
Linden Utah

/''

SERVICE LIST

Mary Dahlberg, Esq
Deputy Attorney General
1300 "I" Street, Suite 125
P.O Box 944255
Sacramento California,94244-2550

Attorney for Intervenor
(Orange County for Respondent)

Appellate Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City Utah, 84114

[8 copies]

Barry J. Brooks
3500 Cassava Drive
Austin, TX 78746-6691

Amicus Brief, Letter Brief

Judge Claudia Laycock
Fourth District Court, Utah County
125 North, 100 West
Provo, Utah, 84601
David Drake
6905 S 1300 East. #248
Midvale, Utah 84047

Plaintiffs Utah Counsel
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3
4
5

Attorneys for

Respondent

6
7
8

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9

FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE

10
11

In Re the Marriage of:

CASE NUMBER:

12

Petitioner:

DECLARATION OF GERALD D.
LUNDAHL

13

and

14

Respondent:

RUTH M. LUNDAHL

51 27 86

GERALD D. LUNDAHL

15
16

1, GERALD D. LUNDAHL, declare:

17

1•

I am the Respondent in the above-captioned case and am

18

personally familiar with all of the facts stated hereinbelow.

19

called upon to testify as to these facts I could and would do so

20

competently of my own first-hand knowledge.

i ,L*

/fr

21
22

If

2,

I have been absolutely hounded to deaxh from this woman

23

from the time that/she divorced me back in 1^977, Jalmost ten (10)

24

years ago,

25

for the purpose of submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the

26

State of Utah to modify all of the many Court Hearings set by my

27

ex-wife in that state.

28

of California will provide her with higher child support orders,

I have voluntarily travelled aTl of the way to Utah

Now that she has decided that the State

she has returned to the State of California in order to obtain
- 1-

10

CERTIFIED COPY

Superior Court of the State of California
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California, on Wednesday, June 30, 1993, commencing at
9:30 a.m., before Sherry L. Barnard, CSR #4222, pursuant to
Notice.

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL:
For the Petitioner:
SONJA H. RHODES
Attorney at Law
1820 East 17th Street
Santa Ana, California 92701
For the Respondent:
LAW OFFICES OF SEASTROM & FISHER
BY: Michael A. Fisher
Attorney at Law
in333 City Boulevard West, Suite 710
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AMACK SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION

.s

A

Yes.

Q

How much are you ordered to pay her on a monthly

basis?
A

I'm not sure.

I have a Utah order.

I have a

California order and I'm not following either.
Q

What does the Utah order say?

A

3,000 a month family support,

Q

I'm sorry?

A

3,000 a month family support.

Q

And that would have been for both Marlene and

A

Kwinci.

Q

—

A

Correct.

Q

Have you instituted any action to modify that

—

Kwinci; right?

order?
A

Yes.

Q

Has a hearing been set?

A

The next hearing is the 29th of July, but I think

that's a settlement conference.

I don't think that there's

been a court date set yet.
Q

Now you're telling me then in the same divorce to

Marlene. there's also a California order?
A

Yes.

Q

What does the California order say?

A

That I should be paying her $1250 alimony.
23
AMACK SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION

A

No, I have an action in Utah.

Riverside

essentially looked at the thing all in all and said go back to
Utah; that's where this thing belongs.

So right now we have

split jurisdiction; custody jurisdiction is in California and
N alimony jurisdiction is in Utah.
Q

Does California agree that it no longer has

jurisdiction over the support issue?
A

Well that's Riverside's opinion.

So we have never

been to court in Riverside.
MR. FISHER:

Let me ask your attorney, even though she

hasn't been sworn in, we'll trust that she will answer
honestly.

There's an Orange County order that says he's to

pay $1250 a month in spousal support to Marlene?
MS. RHODES:

I have reviewed the court order; I did not

represent him at the time.
custody of Kwinci.

The only work I have done was the

She came here and got an order in '87, so

resubmitted herself to California jurisdiction.
So yes, there is that $1200 order but Utah again
apparently, as I understand it, reasserted jurisdiction when
she went there and had a default hearing and got a $3,000
order-

And that Orange County Superior Court found that it

had jurisdiction to change custody of Kwinci though.

And the

court has made no determination asking for modification of the
spousal support order at that timeSo he really has three different things going I
25
AMACK SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION

3500 Cassava Dr.
Austin, TX 78746-1500
512-460-6691

Barry J. Brooks
October 31,2003

Honorable Justices Aronson, Bedsworth & Fybel
4th District Court of Appeal, Division 3
925 N. Spurgeon Street
Santa Ana, CA 92702
RE:

G030846
Lundahl v. Lundahl
Amicus Letter Brief- due 11/3/03

Honorable Justices:
Amicus curiae, Barry J. Brooks, files this reply to the Court's order issued September 30, 2003.
(1) whether an order denying a petition to vacate registration of an out-ofstate support order is an appealable order
Amicus will defer to the California attorneys for thorough briefing on this issue.

(2) whether the Utah state court could issue independent spousal support orders on April 21,1991 and April 13,1995 without modifying, superceding,
or nullifying the parties' 1977 California divorce decree or a 1994 California
support order
Amicus curiae would respond that in 1991 and 1995, Utah could only is^ue independent
spousal support orders. To this day, Utah can not enter an order that modifies, supere^aes, or
nullifies the spousal support provisions of any California orders.
The Court in Kammersall made the correct analysis of the effect of multiple support
orders. That analysis is applicable to this case. Until the enactment of the Full Fath and Credit
for Child Support Orders Act (FCCSOA, 28 U.S.C.A. 1738B) or the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA), states were able to establish multiple child and spousal support orders. As
Kammersall explains, a subsequent order did not "modify" a previous order. Kammersall v.
Kammersall 792 P. 2d 496, 498 (Utah 1990).
Amicus Letter Brief- Page 1 of 7

The assertion b\ GERALD that a subsequent order is "void and of no force and effect" is
incorrect. (Appellant's Letter Brief, pg. 5) As the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is true that under these acts a 'responding state1 . . . may set a different amount that the
'obligorXdefendant) must pay, and in that sense there is a * modification1 of an amount,
but we do not believe and do not hold that the decree of the 'initiating' state . . . was
modified, vacated, reformed or eliminated. Oglesby v. Oglesby, 510 P,2d 1106, 1107
(1973).
This principle is applicable regardless of which order sets the highest amount of support.
A subsequent order that sets a lower support amount has no mathematical effect on the aggregate
arrears that may be owed. Conversely, a subsequent order that sets a higher support amount has
the undeniable effect of being the order used to calculate the aggregate arrears. While the
subsequent lower order may have no effect on the calculations, it is still a valid order that is in
force. If the support under the first order terminates earlier than the support under the second;
obviously, the second order would have force and effect on the ongoing obligation and any
arrears after the termination of the initial order.
Reliance on Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841, P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) is
completely misplaced since Utah has correctly held it is only applicable to subject matter
jurisdiction between two Utah courts. Bankler v. Bankler, 963 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). Citing Oglesby, the court in Bankler basically reaffirms the proposition that the ability to
"modify" its initial order rests solely with the initial court. Id. The Bankler court was not
presented the issue whether a Utah court could enter a valid, independent, subsequent order in
the context of there being another state's order.
One of the major differences between interstate and intrastate family law prior to UIFSA
and FFCCSOA was the ability of one state to establish an order for prospective support when
there was an existing order on the same issue in another state. Within many states, there was
only one court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support issue. In the interstate
context, there was no exclusivity principle. There could be several orders from courts in
different states and each court had continuing jurisdiction over its order. The court also had
exclusive jurisdiction in the sense that no court in another state could modify or invalidate the
order. However, there was no exclusivity over the support obligation. This multiplicity of valid
obligations created the problem that UIFSA was designed to solve.
The ability and practice of a subsequent court entering a valid child support order in a
different amount dwindled as states began to adopt UIFSA. A state adopting UIFSA no longer
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had the ability to issue new, subsequent orders. The practice came to a complete halt with the
enactment of FFCCSOA on October 20, 1994. After that date, a state must give full faith and
credit to the child support order issue by a another state. New orders are not permitted. Only
"true modifications" can occur. As the practice of entering subsequent orders ceases, there
becomes only one tribunal with the exclusive jurisdiction to prospectively modify the support
obligation.
Recognizing that multiple, valid orders entitled to full faith and credit had been created,
both FFCCSOA and UIFSA set up the same mechanism to determine which of the multiple
orders would control the issue of prospective support. 28 U.S.C.A 1738B(f) & Fam. Code 4911.
FFCCSOA only applies to child support orders. However, UIFSA as a matter of state law does
apply to spousal support orders. (Fam. Code § 490 l(r) and (u)) It is premised on there being one
tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over all support (child or spouse) obligations. UIFSA
provides for a very limited circumstance that will allow transfer of the exclusive jurisdiction to
modify the child support obligation. The distinction between child support and spousal support
is that once the first tribunal enters an order regarding the spousal support obligation, the
obligation can only be modified by that tribunal. (Fam. Code § 4909) (Brief of Amicus Curiae
has already discussed the fact that the determination of controlling order provisions of UIFSA do
not apply to spousal support orders.)

(3) whether the Utah state court proceeding that resulted in support orders
from that court were conducted pursuant to the Revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, or another
statute
Amicus curiae would respond that the initial Utah spousal support order was an
independent cause of action not conducted pursuant to either the Revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) or the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
The resolution of this issue is not dependent on the caption of the pleadings. Often, it is
not dependent on the imprecise wording of an order. As the court noted in Oglesby, an interstate
"modification" is not really a modification. Oglesby, supra at 1107. Of greater significance is
the Utah court's recitation in the 1991 "Order on Order to Show Cause" that the court issued its
order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3). Although this section has been revised since
1991, the substance remains the same. In pertinent part, it provided in 1991: "The court has

Amicus Letter Brief- Page 3 of 7

lli

continuing jurisdiction to make . . new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties,
as is reasonable and necessary.1' Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3) (revised)
Any contention by GERALD that Utah can only establish spousal support in the context
of a divorce, is unavailable. The Utah Supreme Court confirmed that the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) permitted Utah to establish an independent spousal
support order. Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 P.2d 200, 202 (1976) It is interesting to note that the
court in Lamberth fell into the misnomer addressed by the same court in Oglesby and
characterized the Utah action as a "reduction" of the support previously ordered. Id The court
obviously believed the subsequent Utah order was a valid order.
Amicus would disagree with GERALD that this action for a new spousal support amount
was pursued under the Utah Foreign Judgments Act. (Appellant's Letter Brief, pg. 8) Bankler is
correct:
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act does not confer jurisdiction on a Utah court to
prospectively modify an order issued by a foreign state c o u r t . . . . Bankler, supra at 800
(emphasis added)
The Utah Foreign Judgments Act is similar to the Foreign Judgment Acts of most states.
It is a legal construct for enforcing judgments. It is not to be used to establish prospective
obligations. Its ability to even alter existing judgments is extremely limited. It is a method for
collection of obligations that have been reduced to a judgment or have become judgments by
operation of law.
It is precisely because of the temporal limitations on actions under a Foreign Judgment
Act that URESA and RURESA were utilized for family support. For cases with no orders, they
provided a structure for a resident of one state to obtain services in another state for the
establishment of an order. URESA and RURESA also provided a legal construct for a tribunal in
one state to issue a new support order for prospective support when there was already an
existing order in another state: GERALD is correct that the orders in this case were not obtained
using RURESA. One distinction is that private counsel was used instead of the Department of
Human Services or the Title IV-D agency. ; Ho we ver, the use of RURESA is not dispositive of
the validity of the order.
The version of RURESA used by Utah acknowledged: "The remedies herein provided are
in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies". Utah Code Ann. 77-31-3
(repealed). It further provided: "'Support order' means any judgment, decree or order of support,
. . . regardless of the kind of action in which it is entered" and "'Duty of support' includes any
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dutv of support imposed 01 imposable b\ law or b> an> court order, decree or judgment
whether incidental to a pioceedmg for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or
otherwise" Utah Code Ann 77-3 1-2(10) and Utah Code Ann 77-3 1-2(6) ( both repealed)
Clearly, at the time the Utah court entered its orders, RURES A was not the exclusive means to
obtain spousal support in Utah As the Utah court noted, the duty of support in this case was
imposable under Utah Code Ann 30-3-5(3) and was imposed by a court order in a proceeding for
separate maintenance

(4) whether the September 22, 2003 Utah state court order has been appealed
and if so, the effect of the pendency of that appeal on this proceeding
Amicus curiae can only hope that the 2003 Utah state court rulings will ultimately be
reviewed by a competent court Not only is it incorrect in this case, but, it misconstrues the
entire jurisprudence of Utah.
As previously discussed, to the extent the Utah court was "purporting to modify" the
existing California order, it was not a true "modification". Thus, the first issue decided in the
2003 Utah ocder is not factually correct. To be sustained, the decision would have to be recharacterized as a finding in 2003 that the same court did not have jurisdiction to enter its
independent order in 1995. The fallacy of this has been discussed as well. The Utah court's
holding that it is invalidating the April 13, 1995 Order has the effect of reinstating the original
1991 Order. If this ruling is correct, GERALD actually owes support at the higher 1991 rate.
The ruling does nothing to invalidate the Judgment obtained in 1999. It should be noted that the
arguments being made now were available in 1999 but were not raised either at the hearing that
lead to the judgment nor in any appeal. The incorrectness of the ruling is also apparent since the
1995 order modified the 1991 Utah order, not any California order.
The second issue ruled upon by the court in the 2003 Utah order is essentially the same as
the first and the associated problems are the same as discussed above.
Assuming the court's third ruling is upheld, it will resolve the issue first propounded to
amicus curiae - the determination of a prospectively controlling order. If Utah is now deferring
exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support to California, then prospective support will be what
California determines. However, this ruling can only be prospective.
Apparently, the Utah court was lead to believe that waiving the wand of UIFSA over the
case would solve all issues. Thus, the court decided to apply UIFSA retroactively and
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unconditionally

The application is not that simple GERALD would have this court believe that

"'the trend" is to use UIFSA to declare all subsequent orders enteied using URESA, RURES A, 01
some other remedy are superfluous and void ab initio (Appellant's Letter Brief, pg 9 citmg State
of Utah, Dept of Human Services v Jacoby\ 975 P 2d 939 (Utah Ct App 1999)) No state had
gone that far This interpretation of retroactivity would mean the section on determining the
controlling order in a multiple order situation is truly superfluous

(See Fam Code § 4911)

Likewise, the section on simultaneous credit for payments under multiple orders, a key pro\ ision
of URESA and RURESA, is meaningless, (See Fam. Code § 4913) If all subsequent orders are
now void in Utah, actions for refunds when those orders were higher should soon abound. The
holding does not make it clear if it applies to all subsequent orders from all states that are now
being enforced in Utah or it applies to all subsequent Utah orders regardless of where they are
being enforced. It is obviously this last application that GERALD is wanting to foist upon this
court. Being stated without any restrictions, the ruling would apply to both child and spousal
support orders.
What Jacoby held is that the procedural aspects of UIFS A can be applied retroactively.
Id. at 942. This is the corollary to the "general rule followed in Utah" that the substantive law in
effect at the time the action was initiated governs the action. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d. 438 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998) Surely, GERALD will not contend that retroactively invalidating all support
orders that were valid at the time of entry is only "procedural'5. It is also doubtful that Utah
intends this wholesale invalidation to be its jurisprudence.
Proper resolution of this and future cases depends upon the correct interpretation and
application of interstate family law concepts. It is certainly understandable that this court must
factor in the effect of an appeal of the 2003 Utah order into its decision. Amicus curiae would
suggest there is an approach that would enable all issues to be resolved instead of continuing the
multi-state litigation. In the 2003 order, the Utah court cedes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over the spousal support issue to competent courts in California. Under Utah law, the issue of
whether a law operates retroactively is a question of law and no deference to the decision of a
district court must be given. Jacoby, supra at 941. In addition, the issue of retroactivity of
UIFSA is a lynchpin of GERALD's argument in California that Utah lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to enter its orders. Thus, this court can accept the tender of continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction, combine it with the issue having been raised in California, and apply Utah law to
decide UIFSA does not apply retroactively to void all subsequent orders entered in cases with
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existing oiders ff the premise that UIFS \ applies retroacti\ ely to m\ alidate all subsequent
orders is found to be incorrect, then at the time of entry of the orders in this case, Utah law
allowed subsequent spousal support orders to be established using either general family law
provisions or RURJESA, so the orders entered by Utah are valid Valid sister state judgments are
entitled to full faith and credit meaning GERALD owes all missed payments of spousal support
calculated using the highest order in existence at the time.
If this court want to further assure the correctness of its rulings, UIFS A facilitates this.
Tribunals can communicate with each other. If it so desires, this court is certainly able to contact
any appropriate court in Utah for assistance in resolving any matters in this case. (Fam. Code §
4931) Ultimately, the goal of resolving interstate family law issues must be a body of law that is
founded on fundamental concepts shared by all states.

Respectfully submitted,

Bfolfy4?Brooks
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Hon David G Sills, Presiding Justice
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three
925 Spurgeon Street
Santa Ana, CA 92701

RE

Landahl v. Lundahl
4th District Court of Appeal, Division 3. Case No. GO30846
LETTER BRIEF

Dear Justice Sills:
As ordered by the court on September 30, 2003, respondent Orange County Department
of Child Support Services files this letter brief on the following issues:
1)
Whether an order denying a petition to vacate registration of an out-ofstate support order is an appealable order;
2)
Whether the Utah state court could issue independent spousal support
orders on April 21, 1991 and April 13, 1995 without modifying, superceding, or
nullifying the parties' 1977 California divorce decree or a 1994 California support
order;
3)
Whether the Utah state court proceedings that resulted in support orders
from that court were conducted pursuant to the Revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), the Utah Foreign Judgment Act (UFJA),
or another statute; and
4)
Whether the September 22, 2003 Utah state court order has been appealed
and, if so, the effect of the pendency of that appeal in this proceeding.
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1)

APPEALABILITY

The court directed the parties to Cowan v. Moreno (Tex.Ct.App. 1995) 903 S.W.2d 119,
124 [order under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act not appealable], Fishman v. Fishman
(1981) 117 Cal.App 3d 815, 819 [order under Sister State Money Judgment Act (SSMJA)
appealable], and code of Civil Procedure section 1710.10, subdivision (c) [SSMJA not applicable
to support orders]. The Department asserts this order is not appealable, but the purported appeal
should be considered by this court as a petition for writ of prohibition. The Department takes this
position because the current spousal support order became enforceable when the registration was
confirmed thus placing Mr. Lundahl in a position of needing immediate relief if his argument is
ultimately accepted. The Department also believes this course will conserve judicial resources
because an appeal will be most likely be filed again after the trial court determines the arrears
under the Utah orders.
The Cowan trial court confirmed the registration but specifically declined to rule on the
decree's enforceability and did not set the arrears. (Cowan v. Moreno, supra, 903 S.W.2d at p.
121.) The Texas Court of Appeals held that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)
controlled the registration because the registration was filed in Texas after its enactment. (Id. at
p. 122.) The court went on to hold that under UIFSA, the petition to register raises the issue of
enforcement of arrearages. (Id. at p. 123.) Furthermore, since the order to be registered was
valid on its face, it could only be attacked upon specific limited grounds such as lack of personal
jurisdiction or some procedural defect that would render the decree void. (Ibid.) "There is no
defense . . . to the registration of a valid foreign support order.' UIFSA § 606, Comment, 9
U.L.A 126, 160(Supp. 1994)." (Ibid.) The court held that Cowan's pleading challenged the
amount of the arrears, which relates to enforceability rather than to the existence of the support
order. (Id. at pp. 123-124.) Since the trial court expressly declined to establish the arrears,
reserving the issue for later hearing, the order was interlocutory. (Id. at p. 124.) The appeal was
dismissed because there was no jurisdiction to appeal an interlocutory order. (Ibid)
This case stands on very nearly the same footing. The order on appeal denied Mr.
Lundahl's request to vacate the registration, but specifically continued the issue of the amount of
arrears owed. (Appellant's Appendix (AA) Vol. II, p. 394.) The issue of arrears was later taken
off calendar until this appeal has been concluded. (Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit A) 1 This
is thus an interlocutory order and the appeal should be dismissed.
The order on appeal in Fishman was an order denying registration of a New York order
for attorney fees in a dissolution action. (Fishman v. Fishman, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 818.)
1

The Department has filed a motion for judicial notice to include the minute order taking
the issue of arrears off calendar simultaneously with this letter brief.
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The obligee registered the order under the Sister State Money Judgment Act (Code Civil Proa,
§§ 1710.10, et seq ) {Ibid) The court held that this was appealable as an order on a motion to
vacate the registration of a sister state money judgment. {Id. at p. 819.) The court did not
analyze appealability under URESA The court held that whether the New York order was a
"support order" governed by URESA or not, it was properly registered under the SSMJA
because URESA was not designed to limit remedies but to add remedies to obligees in support
actions. {Id. at p. 821-822 ) The court summed up its holdings by stating that the New York
order was a money judgment, it was final, for a liquidated sum, and it was nonmodifiable. {Id. at
p. 823.) Fishman is thus distinguishable from this case because the order from Utah is a support
order registered under UIFS A and not liquidated. Furthermore, it is clear that support orders are
not included in the definition of "sister state judgment" in Code of Civil Procedure section
1710.10, subdivision (c). The analysis under Fishman does not apply in this case.
Mr. Lundahl argues that this case is appealable because the Utah orders, having been
registered in California, are immediately enforceable. (Letter Brief, p. 2.) He looks for support of
his contention in the holding from In re Marriage of Adams (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 863 which
stated that "'Such postjudgment order, which relates to enforcement of the judgment, is
appealable. [Citation.]'" {Id. at p. 688.) However, "such postjudgment order" in that case
related specifically to a postjudgment order granting or denying motions under former Civil Code
section 5124, which related to community property settlements and military retirements within
certain time limits. {Id. at p. 686, fn. 3.) This case does not involve any order of that type.
Generally, the main basis for appeals in family law and other civil matters is Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.1, which codifies the "one final judgment rule" and provides that only final
judgments are appealable. Labels affixed by the trial court cannot determine appealability, rather
it is the substance and effect of the court's order or judgment that must be considered. {In re
Marriage ofLoya (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 1636, 1638.) Family Code section 3554 provides that
"[a]n appeal may be taken from an order or judgment under this division [Division 9 Support] as
in other civil actions." (Fam. Code, § 3554.) Nevertheless, a judgment must fully dispose of the
litigated matter, i.e., there must be a final determination of the parties' rights, before an appellate
court will entertain an appeal. {In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 685, 689.)
This order does not fully dispose of the issues before the court because Mr. LundahTs
arrearage obligation was continued to a future date, since taken off calendar due to this appeal
Having shown that this order is not appealable, the Department nonetheless requests this
court to rule on the issues because Mr. Lundahl could be prejudicially harmed if this court
declines to hear the matter now. The Utah spousal support order became enforceable
immediately upon confirmation of registration. Mr. Lundahl's petition for writ of supercedeas
was denied. Furthermore, an opinion from this court would promote judicial economy by making
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unnecessary the filing of a new appeal after the trial court sets the arrears under the Utah orders.
This court has jurisdiction to deem the appeal to be a petition for writ of prohibition (Olson v.
Cory (1983) 35 Cal 3d 390, 400 ) The record is adequate to demonstrate that immediate review
is necessary to protect all of the parties
2)

E F F E C T O F T H E 1991 AND 1995 UTAH ORDERS ON T H E 1977
CALIFORNIA DISSOLUTION ORDER

The Department adopts the argument of amicus curiae regarding this issue - the Utah
orders did not modify the California orders, they were independent orders running concurrently
and adds the following.
Under URESA, child and spousal support were treated identically. (Sampson, Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (1996) Fam. L. Q., Summer 1998, Prefatory Note, at 403.) It is
well-settled law that the responding state in a URES A action could not modify a support order
from another state without clearly stating that the new judgment modified the previous judgment
and only then with proper notice and opportunity to be heard. (See former Fam. Code, § 4840
(repealed by stats. 1997, ch. 194, § 1); In re Marriage of Ward (1994) 29 Cal. App.4th 1452,
1456-1457; In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 521-522.) Instead the
responding state entered a de novo order. (Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents Pay: Interstate
Child Support Enforcement after United States v. Lopez (Apr. 1996), 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469,
1484.) The two judgments ran concurrently and payments to one were credited against the other.
(Former Fam. Code, § 4840.) If an obligor chose to pay on the lower order, arrears would accrue
under the higher order to account for the difference. This is what happened in this case.
Kammersell v. Kammersell (Utah 1990) 792 P.2d 496 is in accord with this reasoning. In
Kammersell, a Pennsylvania court, responding to a request from Utah to enforce a Utah order,
entered a lower support amount. (Kammersell, supra, 792 P.2d at p. 496-497.) The Utah court
held that Pennsylvania had not modified the Utah order because it did not specifically provide that
it was a modification as required by URESA (Id at p. 498-499.) Since it was the Utah order
that was higher, the court was not required to review the validity of the Pennsylvania order arrears had accrued under the higher Utah order. (Id, at p. 498.)
As amicus curiae pointed out, Mr. Lundahl's reliance on Rimensburger v. Rimensbarger
(Utah.Ct. App. 1992) 841 P.2d 709 is misplaced. That opinion was interpreting Utah's intrastate
transfer of jurisdiction and found that, internally, one district court did not have jurisdiction to
modify the orders of another district court. (Id. at p. 710.) It did not address the issue of
establishing a de novo order.
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WERE THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO
URESA, UFJA, OR OTHER STATUTE?

The Department adopts the argument of amicus curiae that the Utah spousal support order
was not issued pursuant to URESA or UFJA In this case, the action in Utah began as a civil
complaint by Mr. Lundahl to enforce his visitation rights. The Utah court had jurisdiction to
entertain an order for support in such an action. (See, e g , Utah Codes Annotated 1953 §
30-3-3 [in any action to establish an order for parent-time, the court may order a party to provide
support for the other party during the pendency of the action].)
4)

THE SEPTEMBER 22, 2003, UTAH ORDER HAS BEEN APPEALED

Respondent, Ruth Telford (Lundahl) filed a notice of appeal with the Utah Court of
Appeals on October 2, 2003. (Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibits B, C.)
The Department adopts and joins in the argument of amicus curiae regarding the errors of
the 2003 Utah order
The order in Utah appears to be in response to a motion to strike respondent's order to
show cause filed by Mr. Lundahl on March 4, 2003, while this appeal was pending. (Motion for
Judicial Notice, Exhibit B, p. 13.) The Order to Show cause was issued on May 29, 2002, and
Mr. Lundahl was served on June 22, 2002. {Id. at p. 11) These dates are significant when it is
noted that the order on appeal in California was entered May 3, 2002, (AA Vol. II, p. 393), and
the notice of appeal in California was filed on July 2, 2002 (AA Vol. II, pp. 396-397).
Furthermore, at least part of the delay in hearing the order to show cause in Utah was because
Mr. Lundahl filed a federal action, naming some of the judges in Utah as defendants, which
required recusal. (Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit B, p. 12.)
CONCLUSIONS
1) This court should hear the matter on the merits, whether as an appeal or petition for
writ of prohibition.
2) The Utah and California orders are concurrent orders, neither state having jurisdiction
to modify the other state's judgments.
3) The Utah orders were entered in a civil action initiated by Mr. Lundahl to enforce his
visitation rights.
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4) The 2003 Utah order is on appeal and should not effect this court's consideration of
the issues
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